## 1AC

### FW (2:00)

First, The 1AC is a politics of invention, a rupture which unshackles us from static notions of history and recognizes identity as fluid not fixed. It a revolution which introduces new performances into the world - we adopt this positionality in the 1AC as the starting point for better solutions.

Marriott in **‘**14, [Marriott, David. "No lords A-leaping: Fanon, CLR James, and the politics of invention." Humanities 3.4 (2014): 517-545. SK]

“I should constantly remind myself”, writes Fanon, “that **the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence**” ([1], p. 229). And just before this sentence: “I am not a prisoner of History [l’Histoire]. I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny” ([1], p. 229). In all of Fanon’s writings I know of no passage that sums up, to the same extent, the enigma of his thought. The point of these gestures seems to be that “invention”, so often invoked as though it were eo ipso something historical, is here the figure for a kind of radical untimeliness that entails a leap, and **this leap** cannot be anticipated, nor can it be prepared for, nor **can[not] it be traced back to a prior historical moment to be interrogated as such**. To leap, then, is more than a rhetorical figure; indeed, we need to see it as the very conceptuality that Fanon puts into play here, as that which cuts through the continuum of history: and in its wake only remnants remain. Fanon needs to remind himself of this. He needs to remind himself of the devastating consequences of invention and of history. (In this he is closely related to Benjamin, whose angelus novus is just as essentially a figure of danger and hope (cf. [2])). **Invention, because it is a radical transformation, is not reducible to** economy or strategy, and therefore, we might want to say, yet another form of **political calculation**. Nor is it a mode for utopia, whose possibility can now be resurrected in a myth of perfectibility, when the oppressed take a dialectical leap into the “open air of history” ([2], p. 253). This is why **invention is not reducible to any kind of teleological schema**. **Despite the primary role which history plays in the meaning of colonial subjection**, **clinging to its truth or whatever happens to be regarded as its truth can only be imprisoning**, **or backward-looking, for the inventor**. Although none of Fanon’s texts are explicitly devoted to this configuration, the ethical-political implications of invention can be seen throughout Fanon’s work, although it is less obvious what these implications might be. I want to argue that **this situation is already inventive, insofar as it gives rise in Fanon’s work to a singular politics of invention, and one premised on a leap that is neither a catastrophe or fall, advent or realization and is mostly incomprehensible to what came before.** From there it is but a step to the notion that invention is revolution **and that the true task of politics is to** embrace or demand **this imperious leap.** **Political reinvention**, on this view, **begins with interruption or fracture**, **and not memory or recollection**, **and cannot but appear as violent to the use of traditional concepts**, in politics, **of negation and affirmation**. Therefore, if one says—as Fanon has just said—that this invention can never be “enslaved” by the past, and its meaning circumscribed by history, **what the leap implies is a situation of radical indecision whose emergence introduces something entirely new into the world.** Humanities 2014, 3 519 To do justice to Fanon’s thinking one must therefore never lose sight of **invention**—which, to be sure, **opens up a fracture or hole in History.** **This more explicitly radical opening can be characterized as taking place in a space between a “phenomenological” critique of race** (including the space given to race by Césaire or Sartre), **and a “political” attempt to retrieve a sense of rebellion that avoids the “pitfalls” of spontaneity**: vengeance, indiscipline, an immediacy which is both “radical and totalitarian” ([3], p. 105). Fanon wants both to register the force of phenomenology’s (or more radically) Sartre’s suspicion of historicism in the traditional figuring of black invention, and Césaire’s powerful claim, in his Cahier, that blackness be re-considered first as anti-invention, prior to what he calls the purity of its failure. There is, however, a caveat: Sartre’s rendering of negritude slams the door shut on black creativity and encloses it in an historicism; and in Césaire, black existence, whose meaning plunges from abyss to mythical abyss, finds a last refuge in a “‘bitter brotherhood’ that imprisons all of us alike” ([1], p. 124). The reference to Césaire seems almost as essential to Fanon as the reference to Sartre, and one way of tracking a path through Fanon’s work is to follow the great chapter in Black Skin, White Masks devoted to Césaire’s Cahier and Sartre’s Orphée Noir. In this chapter on le vecu noir, or black lived experience, the focus is on how Sartre reduces black creativity to neo-Marxist truth or dogma and how Césaire renders black existence in terms of predetermined myths. Both **positions**, incidentally, are felt to be imprisoning: they **cease being inventive the moment they sublate the heterogeneous and singular into fixed ontologies or concepts**. SK

Second, language has no meaning independent of cultural context which conspire to indoctrinate the imperial subject under that mode of language – as such, attempting to force some interpretation of linguistic terms in the resolution or a cultural norm upon us as a way to resist the standpoint of the AC merely reifies these biases - allow us to leverage my offense against T and Theory. TO clarify, this means that all language is valuable, but when conceptions of language are imposed on others, it is detrimental under the framework.

Fanon in ’52, [Fanon, Frantz. Black skin, white masks. Grove press, 1986, Remastered published in 2008. SK]

·**To speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax**, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, **but it means above all to assume a culture, to support** 17 18 / Black Skin, White Mash the weight of **a civilization**. Since the situation is not one-way only, the statement of it should reflect the fact. Here the reader is asked to concede certain points that, however unaceptable they may seem in the beginning, will find the measure of their validity in the facts. The problem that we cqnfront in this chapter is this: The Negro of the Antilles will be proportionately w:hiter -that is, he will come closer to being a real human being -in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language. I am not unaware that this is one of man's attitudes face tO face with Being. -A man who has a language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language. What we are getting at becomes plain: **Mastery of language affords remarkable power**. Paul Valery knew this, for he called language "the god gone astray in the Besh."1 In a work now in preparation I propose to investigate this phenomenon.2 For the moment I want to show why **the Negro** of the Antilles, whoever he is, **has always to face the problem of language**. Furthermore, I will broaden the field of this description and through the Negro of the Antilles include every colonized man. **Every colonized people**-in other words, **every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural** **originality finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation;** that is, with the culture of the mother country. **The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards.** **He [or she] becomes whiter as he [or she] renounces his [or her] blackness**, his **jungle**. In the French colonial army, and particularly in the Senegalese regiments, the black officers serve 1. Charmes (Paris, Gallimard, 1952). 2. Le langage et ragressioit~. Frantz Fanon I 19 first of all as interpreters. They are used to convey the master's orders to their fellows, and they too enjoy a certain position of honor. There is the city, there is the country. There is the capital, there is the province. Apparently the problem in the mother country is the same. Let us take a Lyonnais in Paris: He boasts of tlJe quiet of his city, the intoxicating beauty of the quays of the Uhonc, the splendor of the plane trees, and all those other things that fascinate people who have nothing to do. If you meet him again when he has returned from Paris, and especially if you do not know the capital, he will never run out of its praises: Paris-city-of-light, the Seine, the little garden restaurants, know Paris and die. . . . SK

#### The subjugation of others’ perspectives based on the perspectives of some is a form of colonial violence and assimilation which must be rejected in educational spaces such as schools. Also means the framework outweighs in the context of the topic – education in schools is so colonized that we MUST discuss colonialism in terms of colleges and schools. This means the judge has a constitutive pedagogical obligation to analyze the colonial foundations of what forms of knowledge we consider educational. Logic can justify anything, so we have to make sure that we understand how logical thought is constructed.

Dr. Asante in ’06, [Molefi Kete Asanti (Dr. Molefi Kete Asante is Professor and Chair, Department of African American Studies at Temple University. Considered by his peers to be one of the most distinguished contemporary scholars, Asante has published 77 books. Asante’s high school text, African American History: Journey of Liberation, 2nd Edition, is used in more than 400 schools throughout North America. Asante has been recognized as one of the ten most widely cited African Americans. He is honored as a HistoryMaker with an archival interview in the US Library of Congress. In the 1990s, Black Issues in Higher Education recognized him as one of the most influential leaders in the decade. Molefi Kete Asante graduated from Oklahoma Christian College in 1964. He completed his M.A. at Pepperdine University in 1965. He received his Ph.D. from UCLA at the age of 26 in 1968 and was appointed a full professor at the age of 30 at the State University of New York at Buffalo. In 1969 he was the co-founder with Robert Singleton of the Journal of Black Studies. Asante directed UCLA’s Center for Afro American Studies from 1969 to 1973. He chaired the Communication Department at SUNY-Buffalo from 1973-1980. He worked in Zimbabwe as a trainer of journalists from 1980 to 1982. In the Fall of 1984 Dr. Asante became chair of the African American Studies Program at Temple University where he created the first Ph.D. Program in African American Studies in 1987. He has directed more than 140 Ph.D. dissertations. He has written more than 550 articles and essays for journals, books and magazines and is the founder of the theory of Afrocentricity. Asante was born in Valdosta, Ga., one of sixteen children. His work on African culture and philosophy and African American education has been cited by journals such as the Matices, Journal of Black Studies, Journal of Communication, American Scholar, Daedalus, Western Journal of Black Studies, and Africaological Perspectives. The Utne Reader called him one of the “100 Leading Thinkers” in America. In 2001, Transition Magazine reported “Asante may be the most important professor in Black America.” He has appeared on Nightline, Nighttalk, BET, Macnell Lehrer News Hour, Today Show, the Tony Brown Show, Night Watch, Like It Is and 60 Minutes and more than one hundred local and international television shows. In 2002 he received the distinguished Douglas Ehninger Award for Rhetorical Scholarship from the National Communication Association. The African Union cited him as one of the twelve top scholars of African descent when it invited him to give one of the keynote addresses at the Conference of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora in Dakar in 2004. He was inducted into the Literary Hall of Fame for Writers of African Descent at the Gwendolyn Brooks Center at Chicago State University in 2004. In April 2014 he was invited to give a speech at the UN’s General Assembly on Peace in Africa. In 2014 he was invited to be a keynote speaker at the Japan Black Studies Association’s 60th conference in Kyoto, Japan. Dr. Asante holds more than 100 awards for scholarship and teaching including the Fulbright, honorary doctorates from three universities, and is a guest professor at Zhejiang University and Professor Extraordinarius at the University of South Africa. Dr. Asante has been or is presently a consultant for a dozen school districts. He was the Chair of the United States Commission for FESMAN III for three years.), “Forward,” Dei, George Jerry Sefa, and Arlo Kempf. Anti-colonialism and education. Vol. 7. Sense Publishers, 2006. SK]

ln Anti-Colonialism and Education: 11:: Politics Â«J Resistance, George I. Sefa Dei and Arlo Kempf have given us a stimulating intellectual account of the issues surrounding the active attempt for educational liberation. The authors who have contributed to the volume have been well chosen to present creative approaches to this abiding problem in most of the world- **As we engage** the legacies of **colonialism** we are more certain today than **the nonmaterial legacies are** as **important in our thinking** :5 the material ones **when** M: **engage[ing] questions of resistance and recovery**. **The colonizer did not only seize land, but also minds.** If eolonialisrn's inï¬‚uence had been merely the control of land the would have required only one fonn of resistance. but **when infomation is also colonized. it is essential that the resistance must interrogate issues related to education, information and intellectual transformation**. **Colonialism seeks to impose the will of one people on another and to use the resources of the imposed people for the benefit of the imposer**. Nothing is sacred in such a system as it powers its way toward the extinction of the wills of the imposed upon with one objective in mind: the ultimate subjection of the will to resist. **An effective system of colonialism reduces the imposed upon to a shell of a human who is incapable of thinking in a subjective way of his or her own interest**. **In everything the person becomes like the imposer; thus in desires, wishes, vi- sions, purposes, styles, structures, values, and especially the values of education, the person operates against his or her own interest**. **Colonialism** **does not engender creativity; it stills it, suppresses it under the cloak of assistance when in fact it is creating conditions that make it impossible for humans to effectively resist.** And yet there has always been resistance and there are new methods of resistance gaining ground each day. The intricacies of engaging colonialism are as numerous as the ways colo- nialism has impacted upon the world. Indeed, the political-economic, social- behavioral, and cultural-aesthetic legacies of the colonizing process have left human beings with a variety of ways to confront the impact of those legacies. What we see in Anti-Colonialisnr and Education is a profound attempt to capture for the reader the possibilities inherent in educational transfomration through the politics of resistance. Professors Dei and Kempf have exercised ajudicious imagination in selecting the authors for the chapters in this book. Each author is an expert in the area of the topic, skilled in presentation of the facts based upon current theories, and articulate in the expression of a need for educators to understand the pressures both for and against colonialism. However, they all take the position that **it is necessary to explore all formulations that might achieve a liberated sphere of education**. Since **education normally follows the dominant political lines in a country where you have colonial political principles** you will find colonial education. If you have the vestiges of past colonial practices, you will see those practices re- ï¬‚ected in the educational system. I remember a colleague from Algeria saying to me that when the French ruled the country the students learned that their ancestors were the Gauls. When independence came to Algeria. he said. the people were taught that their ancestors were Arabs. The fact that this was only trrre for those individuals who had Arab origins. and thirty percent did not have such ancestry, was uninteresting to the political agenda. And so it has been in every nation where you have a political intention to mold a country on the basis of domination you will also have resistance. One seems to go with the other regardless to how long the process seems to take to commence. This is not just an exciting work intellectually: it is a beautiful book edited with intelligence and executed with the kind of research and scholarship that will bring us back to its pages many times. Each author seems to feel the sanre desire to teach us **to be truly human; that is enough for us** **to inaugurate our own anti-colonialism campaign in our schools and colleges**. 1 shall gladly join the fray to make the world better. SK

#### This also means that the 1AC framework precludes examinations of Topicality or theory or what the “role of the judge or ballot as an educator” are, because we say that the educational space is corrupted right now. We redefine a concept of what “education” is which means the 1AC’s examination of colonialism controls the internal link as it defines resistance as the starting point of a new concept of education which is anti-colonial.

#### Thus the standard is to combat the colonial institutional subjugation of perspectives.

### Solvency

#### The restriction of free speech extends beyond just chilling protests – colleges stunt the speech of minority students by not hiring minority professors, imposing a Eurocentric curriculum, and stunting multi-perspectivism. This evidence is in the context of Indigenous students, but the warrant applies to all students.

Burk in ’07, [Burk, Nanci M. "Conceptualizing American Indian/Alaska Native college students’ classroom experiences: Negotiating cultural identity between faculty and students." Journal of American Indian Education 46.2 (2007): 1-18. SK]

**Recommendations include energizing the community of scholars and educators by infusing curriculum with multicultural examples and ways of knowing**. **and by providing opponunities for tribal leaders attd elders to be guest speakers**. In this way. American lndian/Alaska Native [**Indigenous] students may become empowered in the communication classroom**. and more often academically successful by witnessing community leaders in academic settings. The community of American lndian/Alaska Native student program directors. students, and families might also inlluence student success. Campus program directors/coordinators could encourage students to enroll in teaching or educational administrative degree programs. **By increasing the numbers of Native educators on campuses. retention of Indigenous students could potentially increase**. Additionally. **increased numbers of Native instructors and administrators would also provide perspectives and insight of** worldviews or ways of knowing other than colonialist paradigms for non-Native educators and students. As more American Indian/Alaska Native educators join the scholarly community. **understanding of diverse worldviews and perspectives will increase**. Agbo's study reminds us. "**culture and the context of the learning process are crucial to the educational achievement of students from ethnic groups**" (2(){)l. p. 33). American Indians/Alaska Natives with unique perspectives and oral traditions could share instntclional techniques and curriculum designs that will benefit college students and educators equally. SK

#### Thus the Advocacy Text: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech as an act against colonialism. I will clarify or modify my advocacy in CX if asked. The 1AC does not defend “free speech” as a Eurocentric construct, but rather engages the question of the material conditions through which minority speech is silenced.

#### Student speech is restricted through exclusion of perspectives – the 1AC is a demand of inclusion of perspectives to determine a pathway for the future.

Flaherty ’15, [Colleen Flaherty(), Student activists want more black faculty members. But how realistic are some of their goals?, No Publication, 11-30-2015, 15, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/30/student-activists-want-more-black-faculty-members-how-realistic-are-some-their-goals, 1-5-2017. SK]

**Increasing faculty diversity has long been a priority on college campuses**, but the recent, widespread student protests over race relations have made the issue all the more urgent. And while a number of institutions already have pledged additional resources to increasing faculty diversity, questions remain about how realistic some of these goals are -- at least in the near term. That’s because **black students remain underrepresented in a variety of Ph.D. programs**. Even trickier, experts agree, is getting more black students to stay in academe after they earn their Ph.D.s., given climate concerns and the fact that they are also in demand elsewhere, including the much better paying corporate world. So **any successful diversity plan, those experts say, will involve not only bringing more black faculty members to campus, but also address the climate issues that will influence whether they stay there**. “Getting to a certain percentage of black faculty by a certain time is a tough road,” said Kimberly Griffin, an associate professor of higher education at the University of Maryland at College Park and co-author of several studies that shed light on the choices of early-career academics of color. “Especially when we're talking about doubling or tripling a population. Increases that significant often require more faculty lines either through retirements and other departures or the creation of new lines, which requires funding” that institutions may not have. And while that “doesn't mean that it shouldn't be a goal by any means,” Griffin added, “I worry about narrow strategies that focus on short-term recruitment and hiring.” The university facing the biggest diversity demand is also ground zero for the recent protests about race, and the treatment of black students in particular. Students at the University of Missouri at Columbia have called on administrators to increase the share of black faculty members to 10 percent by 2017-18, roughly mirroring the share of black undergraduates (8 percent). **Campus activists and others** outside Mizzou **say students need more professors who reflect an increasingly diverse student bod**y, **and that the academy itself benefits from a greater range of perspectives**. Mizzou hasn’t yet formally responded to that demand. A university spokesperson said it was under discussion. Data suggest it would be difficult. Mizzou’s faculty is currently 3 percent black, according to 2013 data from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, meaning that it would have to more than triple its share of black professors within about two years. If Mizzou somehow did meet that goal, it would be way ahead of most of its peers, since just 6 percent of faculty members nationwide are black. Averages are even lower in Mizzou’s immediate peer group, the Southeastern Conference: of 14 universities, just two -- the University of Alabama and the University of Mississippi -- meet the national average of 6 percent black faculty. Mizzou fares worst, but the group average is just 4 percent. A wider analysis by the Associated Press found that no state’s flagship public university campus had a black faculty population approaching 10 percent, and that only a few topped 5 percent. Most campuses were between 2 and 4 percent. **Numerous other colleges and universities have received similar but more general student demands for faculty diversity in recent weeks** -- **meaning that students want to see change** but haven’t cited a specific percentage. In response to the student protests on its campus, Yale University announced a $50 million initiative to fund the hiring of faculty members from historically underrepresented groups. The provost’s office will provide $25 million, and the individual schools and colleges doing the hiring will match an additional $25 million. That approach is similar to one taken by the University of Pennsylvania in 2011, in which the central administration pledged $50 million for faculty diversity hiring and other initiatives. That amount was to be matched by individual colleges and schools. Beyond that, Penn purposely avoided setting a specific diversity goal. That’s primarily because not meeting it might seem like a failure -- even if good was achieved. “The challenge of a specific target like that is of course we’re talking about a finite pool of new Ph.D.s and new professional school graduates and continuing scholars,” Anita Allen, vice provost for the faculty, told Inside Higher Ed earlier this year. “I just don’t know that it’s wise to present those kinds of goals as being imperative to the real goal, which is making the faculty diverse and inclusive.” Brown University, on the other hand, did establish a hard target earlier this year: doubling its percentage of underrepresented minority faculty by 2025, from 9 percent to 18 percent. Like Penn, Brown’s preliminary plan included hiring initiatives, as well as efforts at increasing the number of minority students in the Ph.D. pipeline to the professiorate. Funds also were earmarked for climate and mentoring programs to keep them in academe. This month, in light of recent events, Brown President Christina Paxson announced additional elements to the diversity plan -- including support for undergraduates -- as well as the price tag, previously undisclosed: $100 million. Brown’s updated plan was “profoundly informed, and substantially improved by, recent campus conversations about structural racism,” Paxson wrote in a letter to students, faculty and staff. “The deep pain that we have heard expressed by students of color in the past weeks and months -- a pain that has been affirmed by faculty and staff members who work closely with and care deeply about our students -- is very real.” She added, “Although we cannot solve these problems globally, we can ensure that all members of our community are treated with dignity and respect, and are provided the opportunities they need to reach their full human potential. We can make sure that Brown is a place where these issues are acknowledged and better understood through the courses we teach and the scholarship we conduct. And we can prepare leaders who make significant positive changes in the world throughout their lives.” How realistic are these goals? Penn proves informative. Even with its prestige and an arsenal of cash, progress has been steady but relatively slow -- at least compared to the Mizzou timeline. Between 2011 and 2013, the percentage of new hires who were underrepresented minorities grew from 9 to 14 percent. But the total percentage of underrepresented minorities on the faculty jumped just 1 percent, to 7 percent, from 2010-13. Minority professors over all increased from 13 percent in 2013 to 16 percent in 2014. Part of the problem is that black students are underrepresented in a majority of Ph.D. programs and among Ph.D. holders. While black people make up 14 percent of the U.S. population, they’ve earned roughly 6 percent of the research doctorates awarded to U.S. citizens and permanent residents each year since 2003, according to the National Science Foundation and other federal agencies' Survey of Earned Doctorates. While blacks hold a relatively high proportion of education doctorates, earning about 13 percent of such degrees awarded in 2013, they’re underrepresented in other fields. According to 2013 data, the most recent available, they earned 6 percent of life sciences doctorates, 3 percent of physical sciences doctorates and 5 percent of engineering doctorates. In the social sciences, blacks earned 7 percent of doctorates. It was 5 percent in history and about 4 percent in the humanities. In business, it was 9 percent. According to the survey, 2,167 black citizens or residents earned research doctorates in 2013. Compare that number to 130 -- that's how many full-time black faculty members Kevin Eagan, interim managing director at the Higher Education Research Center at the University of California at Los Angeles, says Mizzou alone would need to hire in the next two years to meet the 10 percent demand. Or consider another stat: of the 128 new faculty members Mizzou hired in 2013, according to IPEDS, just 14 were black, Eagan said. Beyond supply, there are concerns about retention among minority faculty members in higher education. Griffin’s own research suggests that female and minority Ph.D.s in biomedical fields are more likely than others to lose interest in faculty careers while earning their doctorates. A missing piece of the puzzle is “whether the black graduates of doctoral programs actually want to stay in academia, despite their abilities and commitment to their communities,” Griffin said, noting that interest in academic careers among underrepresented minority women in particular still wanes in relation to their peers even when controlling for scholarly productivity, prestige of program and quality of advisers. “Something is happening to career interests in graduate school that we must address to see change.” Climate is one area of concern. **There is a growing literature on the experiences of faculty of color that suggests that they face many challenges in terms of how they and their work are perceived in the tenure and promotion system**, Griffin said. **And they may also be subject to stereotypes and microaggressions** -- subtle slights based on race -- which are at the heart of many of the student protests. Beyond just talking about numbers, Eagan said it’s important to define “faculty” in diversity plans in ways that will actually enhance the student experience -- not just look good on paper. “Having faculty status can mean very different things across campus contexts,” he said. “Will these new hires have contact with the undergraduates engaged in the ongoing dialogue on these campuses, or will they be hired as research faculty, potentially limiting their exposure and visibility to students?” Griffin said students “often expect a great deal from these faculty in terms of mentorship,” and that some have described a “revolving door” of black faculty members, in which one leaves due to climate concerns to replaced by another faculty member of color, and so on. SK

#### In order to combat systemic abuse we must first combat the restriction of speech – empirics prove. Also, critics who claim to target “institutional violence” and “systemic problems” urge us to look at the “broader picture” without targeting the specificity of violence. They may claim that their method is not compatible and are not opposed to speech restrictions but end up stigmatizing allies of their goal which dooms any real solution. Only a combination of reducing free speech restrictions and a more ideological critique can address material conditions without validating positions with the same authority they criticize.

Friedersdorf ’15, [Conor Friedersdorf(), Free Speech on Campus Is Under Attack, Atlantic, 3-4-2016, 16, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-glaring-evidence-that-free-speech-is-threatened-on-campus/471825/, 1-5-2017. SK]

In January of 1987, flyers distributed anonymously at the University of Michigan declared “open season” on black people, referring to them with the most disgusting racial slurs. “Shortly thereafter,” Catherine B. Johnson noted in a law journal article, “a student disc jockey for the campus radio station allowed racist jokes to be told on-air. In response to these incidents, students at the University staged a demonstration to voice their opposition. The rally, however, was interrupted by the display of a Ku Klux Klan uniform dangling out of a nearby dormitory window.” **Students in Ann Arbor were** understandably **upset and outraged by the racist climate** created by these events. **Administrators** decided to respond by **implement[ed]**ing **a speech code**. **Thereafter, racist incidents kept occurring on campus at the same rate as before**. And before the speech code was struck down 18 months later as a violation of the First Amendment, white students had charged black students with offensive speech in 20 cases. One “resulted in the punishment of a black student for using the term ‘white trash’ in conversation with a white student,” the ACLU later reported, explaining its position that “speech codes don't really serve the interests of persecuted groups. The First Amendment does.” Over the course of U.S. history, both the protections enshrined by the First Amendment and the larger ethos of free expression that pervades American culture have played a major role in every successful push that marginalized groups have made to secure civil rights, fight against prejudice, and move toward greater equality. Campus Politics Power, identity, and speech in the new American university Read more Despite that history, Jelani Cobb asserts in The New Yorker that to avoid discussions of racism, critical observers of student protests at Yale and the University of Missouri “invoke a separate principle, one with which few would disagree in the abstract—free speech, respectful participation in class—as the counterpoint to the violation of principles relating to civil rights.” The fact that race controversies “have now been subsumed in a debate over political correctness and free speech on campus—important but largely separate subjects—is proof of the self-serving deflection to which we should be accustomed at this point,” he declares. Cobb calls these supposed diversions “victim-blaming with a software update,” and positing that they are somehow having the same effect as disparaging Trayvon Martin, he cites my article “The New Intolerance of Student Activism” as his prime example. He writes as if unaware that millions of Americans believe the defense of free speech and the fight against racism to be complementary causes, and not at odds with each other. **The false premises underpinning his analysis exacerbate a persistent, counterproductive gulf between the majority of those struggling against racism in the United States, who believe that First Amendment protections, rigorous public discourse, and efforts to educate empowered, resilient young people are the surest ways to a more just future, and a much smaller group that subscribes to a strain of thought most popular on college campuses.** READ FOLLOW-UP NOTES Readers, staffers, and other writers debate the campus controversies **Members of this latter group may be less opposed to speech restrictions; rely more heavily on stigma, call-outs, and norm-shaping in their efforts to combat racism**; **purport to target “institutional" and “systemic” racism**, **but often insist on the urgency of policing racism that is neither systemic nor institutional**, like Halloween costume choices; **focus to an unusual degree on getting validation from administrators and others in positions of authority**; and often seem unaware or unconvinced that others can and do share their ends while objecting to some of their means, the less rigorous parts of their jargon, and campus status-signaling. For this reason, **they spend a lot of time misrepresenting and stigmatizing allies**. Cobb misunderstands my motives, my body of work, and my article, which makes it doubly frustrating that he neglects to provide an outbound link to allow his readers to judge it for themselves. His erroneous assumptions render him less able to engage on this subject with millions who reject his ideology but are sympathetic to his concerns. Let me underscore how erroneous his assumptions are. His article is premised on the notion that my piece on Yale and others like one I wrote a day later on Missouri are part of a “diversion,” an attempt to avoid talking about racism through deflection. “The fault line here,” he posits, “is between those who find intolerance objectionable and those who oppose intolerance of the intolerant.” Of course, it’s far more consistent to find intolerance objectionable across the board, and to speak out against it especially when its targets have historically faced discrimination. It’s why I have written not only about recent events at Yale and Missouri, but also about Ferguson’s conspiracy against black residents; racial disparities in police killings; dangers of constructed white identity; the Campaign Zero agenda; the importance of declaring the Charleston attack to be racial terrorism; the long history of thugs attacking black churches; how video is confirming very old claims about prejudice against blacks; the brutality of police culture in Baltimore; radical experiments in converting racists; the importance of grappling with race, even imperfectly; Islamophobia and its deleterious effects; the perils of standing while Hispanic in the Bronx; the harassment of a black man tazed by a white police officer; carnage caused by drone strikes; the horrifying effects of profiling innocent Muslims, etc. Few outside a small part of the ideological left would mistake me for someone seeking to divert discourse away from racism. Moreover, my advocacy for free speech **encompasses numerous articles about controversies having nothing to do with race**, as well as advocacy for the First Amendment rights of people fighting racism (including high schoolers who sought to wear “I can’t breathe” t-shirts, Black Lives Matter protestors, and **Muslims who sought to build a mosque** near Ground Zero.) When a staunch defender of free speech in all realms, who writes about racism as often as I do in a national publication, is reflexively cast as using free speech to divert attention from racism, it suggests a charge rooted in ideological blindness, not careful observation. I hope to bridge that gap, and help everyone understand that liberals, libertarians, conservatives, and individualists alike are just as engaged in the fight against racism as the campus left, but in very different ways. We exist. **Update the heuristics!** Our diverse critiques of the campus left are not a sign that we care too little about fighting racism, advocating for justice, opposing prejudice, or protecting civil rights, or that we’ve yet to be enlightened by the right theorists. They are, rather, a sign that these issues, and concerns that they touch on, free speech among them, are too important to be ceded to a narrow, ideologically insular subculture as prone to blind spots, mistakes, wrongdoing, and excesses as any other; and too fond of jargon that more readily facilitates evasiveness than analytic clarity. The activist left on campus no more benefits from blanket deference than any other political movement, and their defenders should stop conflating criticism of their means and contested assumptions with opposition to or a desire to distract from widely shared ends. My articles “The New Intolerance of Student Activism” and “Campus Activists Weaponize Safe Space” evoked one critique more than any other: that activist excesses at Yale and the University of Missouri are misunderstood by outsiders who are unaware of the nuanced context of fraught race relations on those campuses. I am, however, aware of the relevant context, including the fact that most every college campus in America has some racists; that this is awful, frustrating, unjust, and disproportionately burdens minority students; that eight years ago at Yale, several students painted their faces black on Halloween; that there are plausible—though contested—allegations that a fraternity at Yale turned black students away from a party, and that many black Yalies have, periodically, confronted racist remarks; that the University of Missouri was the site of anonymous hate speech against black students, and that earlier this autumn, in the New York Times’ telling, “the president of the Missouri Student Association, who is black, reported that he was walking across campus when a group of men in a pickup truck yelled a racial epithet at him.” Cobb puts it aptly as he so often does: The upheaval at Yale and the protests that forced the resignation of University of Missouri President Timothy Wolfe and of Chancellor R. Bowen Loftin are both a product of and distinct from the Black Lives Matter moment we currently inhabit. Students from the University of Missouri participated in protests in Ferguson last year; as the climate on campus became more fraught, activists from Ferguson visited and advised the students. Six weeks ago, I participated in a forum at Yale on the massacre in Charleston. When the historian Edward Ball pointed out that the shootings had occurred on Calhoun Street, named for the intellectual godfather of the Confederacy, students immediately pointed out that Calhoun was an alumnus and that a college is still named for him. All of that is correct. Much of it is outrageous. (And really, to hell with John C. Calhoun.) Says Cobb, offering even more useful context, “Faculty and students at both Yale and the University of Missouri who spoke to me about the protests were careful to point out that they were the culmination of long-simmering concerns.” Agreed. Does any of that justify students spitting on people exiting a campus talk just because they object to what the speaker said? Does it mean that a professor should lose a job in residential life over an email about whether administrators or students should opine on costumes? Should it console an Asian American student whose civil right to take news photographs of a public, outdoor event was thwarted by white faculty and white and black activists who intimidated and pushed him? Cobb doesn’t say. Instead, he stigmatizes the positions I’ve taken without bothering to rebut them. In place of a rebuttal are elegantly written but evasive paragraphs. They invoke history as if obvious conclusions follow, but never specify what they are. Here is one of those paragraphs: “To understand the real complexities of these students’ situation, free-speech purists would have to grapple with what it means to live in a building named for a man who dedicated himself to the principle of white supremacy and to the ownership of your ancestors,” he writes. “That this issue has arisen on the rarified grounds of an Ivy League campus doesn’t diminish the example; it makes it a more pointed illustration that no amount of talent or resources or advantage can shield you entirely from the minimizing sentiments so pervasive in this country.” What on earth do “free speech purists” have to do with the controversy at Yale? What wrongheaded claims are they purportedly making? What does it mean to live in that building? How would grappling with it cause one to change an opinion about spitting on lecture attendees or the chilling effect that would be caused by censuring a professor over a mild email? What is “the real complexity” of the situation? I’d gladly grapple with solid positions––when he takes them, I frequently find Cobb insightful––but try as I might, I cannot tell where he stands on any of this. Cobb goes on to report that a Yale student captured on video shouting at a professor has now been subject to online harassment and death threats. That is reprehensible––not least because, as I noted in my article, which deliberately refrained from naming her, she is by all accounts a lovely, intelligent person who had a bad moment. Punishment for those issuing death threats is warranted in any case. “Surely these threats constitute an infringement upon her free speech,” Cobb writes, “a position that has scarcely been noted amid the outraged First Amendment fundamentalism.” I am noting it now, the moment I learned of the threats. But what does he mean when he invokes “First Amendment fundamentalism”? Death threats are not protected by the First Amendment. The Yale professors have no First Amendment right to their institutional positions. And there is nothing “fundamentalist” about criticizing the students trying to get a professor fired, or those who spit on others. This is a strong word with no bearing on the matter at hand. Given the way that Cobb excerpts and characterizes my piece, New Yorker readers will be surprised to learn that I didn’t, in fact, declare a Yale student’s denunciation of her professor, or anyone’s protest against racism, an example of “catastrophizing.” Had Cobb included the very next sentence in his excerpt from my article, they would have seen that I actually asserted that students were catastrophizing not when arguing with their professors, but when, having failed to secure the apology they demanded for an email, they reportedly declared that “they cannot bear to live in the college anymore,” and one Yale student claimed that friends had stopped eating and sleeping and were having breakdowns. As I see it, when middle-aged adults indulge those reactions as reasonable rather than declaring them to be overwrought, they are doing students a disservice. Instead of empowering them they are indulging them, robbing them of resilience they’ll need to navigate society as adults. Does Cobb disagree? Is he not concerned by those reactions? Does he agree with the notion that Yale students would be better off personally and more effective advocates of social justice if they started acting more like adults? Cobb reports that “Erika, the associate master of the college, wrote an e-mail encouraging students to treat Halloween costumes that they find racially offensive as a free-speech issue.” That fundamentally misunderstands the thrust of her position. In fact, she wrote that while one could think about costumes through the lens of free speech, she wanted to look at them “from a totally different angle.” She spent practically the whole email doing just that, then briefly mentioned, near the very end, that her husband had said, “if you don’t like a costume someone is wearing, look away, or tell them you are offended. Talk to each other. Free speech and the ability to tolerate offence are the hallmarks of a free and open society.” Notice that her approach is not inconsistent with students harshly stigmatizing blackface. As I see it, if Yalies wear blackface on Halloween, it should be handled exactly as it was handled in 2007. In the Yale Daily News, Joshua Cox and Sharifa Love concisely explained the history of blackface and why it is offensive. Afterward, they mused about why a white person would possibly incorporate it in a costume: One conclusion we’ve come to is that some white people are passively ignorant of the history of oppression and pain associated with minstrelsy and blackface. **Because whiteness is normative, race is not as salient for white people as it is for black people**. From early childhood, black children are forced to navigate a racially charged landscape, controlled by people who do not look like them. Black children grow up considering their blackness with every move they make, whereas white children are never forced to consider race because theirs is considered normal. This may explain why some white people are culturally ignorant of the possible ramifications of blackface and other racist actions. This passive ignorance is not an acceptable excuse. Another conclusion we’ve reached is that some white people are consciously, willfully ignorant of the cultural ramifications of their actions. These individuals have some sense of the possible offensiveness of their actions, yet disregard them and decide that they’d rather continue existing in their own normative sphere. This problematic disownment of personal responsibility preempts engagement in offensive actions while shirking social responsibility. This brand of ignorance is more offensive than passivity because one understands the sociocultural ramifications of actions like blackface, but completely ignores them. The last conclusion we’ve come to is that the most heinous brand of ignorance is that of the white person who knowingly takes culturally sensitive material and wields it in an insensitive fashion to openly mock minorities. Those who understand the ramifications of actions like blackface, yet purposefully engage in such actions for the sake of tasteless humor, are utterly despicable. Such premeditated actions are akin to the use of racial epithets because, like slurs, blackface is meant to demean and dehumanize. White people who knowingly commit such actions do so easily from the safety of the racial majority, without regard for those who face the difficulty of life outside of the normative assumption of whiteness. Their analysis is impressive. And it suggests that given the autonomy to shape campus culture, Yale students are as capable of promulgating norms that are opposed to racism as administrators. Because they were empowered to do so on their own, the students presumably accrued knowledge and experience that will serve them well in the future. Yet people arguing for the relative benefits of that demonstrably workable approach are cast as either racially insensitive or ignorant of nuances. In fact, they’re as fully committed to the well-being of students, including those who suffer from racism, as anyone else, but disagree with some student activists and their ideological allies in the press about the best way forward. That is hardly surprising. Examine any cause taken up by 18-year-olds on a college campus and you’ll find ideologically diverse observers who think that they’re mistaken about various assumptions and tactics. I share the notion that **young people with stories about racial injustice should be heard,** and that their descriptions of their experiences are owed a degree of deference, especially by those of us who’ve never navigated college as the member of a minority group. But thoughtless or patronizing deference can be prejudicial, too; and when activist assumptions and tactics elicit intense disagreement even among members of groups victimized by the racism at issue, the notion that deference to “students of color” is even possible requires one to pretend that they constitute a monolithic group who uniformly agree. **Little wonder that black, Hispanic, and Asian American collegians who depart from progressive orthodoxy often keep quiet**, knowing that they’ll be called race-traitors (as one student at Yale was just called) if they are more vocal. What should be done about racist acts at Yale and and the University of Missouri? I’ll hazard some suggestions. A student who defaces a dorm with an excrement swastika should be expelled. Anonymous bigots who yell racial slurs from a pickup truck should be condemned. A frat that discriminates on the basis of race at its parties should have its charter revoked by whatever national organization conferred it. Anonymous threats should be reported to authorities; if possible, the perpetrators should be jailed; and the threatened students should be given protection by campus security. I don’t think that Cobb and I disagree about any of that. (And I have no view of whether the president at Missouri was justly removed or not. He may well have been an abject failure.) The thorniest question of all: What should be done about the fact that many black students at institutions as different as Yale and the University of Missouri feel that they inhabit campuses with racist climates where they are less welcome than others? Insofar as free speech is invoked during such controversies about racism on university campuses, it is because many leftist activists believe one necessary remedy for racism is for administrators to punish speech that they regard as problematic. But the First Amendment flatly prohibits that remedy at the University of Missouri and at all public institutions. For observers like me, there is tremendous interest in zealously defending that civil right, not only because it protects the vocation that Cobb and I share, but for a reason articulated most powerfully by the ACLU: Free speech rights are indivisible. Restricting the speech of one group or individual jeopardizes everyone's rights because the same laws or regulations used to silence bigots can be used to silence you. Conversely, laws that defend free speech for bigots can be used to defend the rights of civil rights workers, anti-war protesters, lesbian and gay activists and others fighting for justice. For example, in the 1949 case of Terminiello v. Chicago, the ACLU successfully defended an ex-Catholic priest who had delivered a racist and anti-semitic speech. The precedent set in that case became the basis for the ACLU's successful defense of civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s and '70s. The indivisibility principle was also illustrated in the case of Neo-Nazis whose right to march in Skokie, Illinois in 1979 was successfully defended by the ACLU. At the time, then ACLU Executive Director Aryeh Neier, whose relatives died in Hitler's concentration camps during World War II, commented: "Keeping a few Nazis off the streets of Skokie will serve Jews poorly if it means that the freedoms to speak, publish or assemble any place in the United States are thereby weakened." Cobb would do better to engage that argument, if he finds it wrongheaded, than to charge that free speech is being raised disingenuously to divert attention from racism or to absurdly compare defenses of free speech to defenses of George Zimmerman. The closest he comes to constructively engaging on the subject is here: Last year, at the University of Connecticut, where I teach, white fraternity members harassed and purportedly shouted epithets at members of a black sorority; the incident generated an afterlife of hostility on Internet forums, where black female students were derided and ridiculed. Eight months ago, fraternity members at the University of Oklahoma were filmed singing an ode to lynching. These are not abstractions. And this is where the arguments about the freedom of speech become most tone deaf. The freedom to offend the powerful is not equivalent to the freedom to bully the relatively disempowered. The enlightenment principles that undergird free speech also prescribed that the natural limits of one’s liberty lie at the precise point at which it begins to impose upon the liberty of another. All these incidents should be roundly condemned; harassment should be punished; hostility on Internet forums will exist regardless of what anyone does, as most working journalists can attest; and yes, the limits of liberty do lie at the point where one begins to impose on another. But excepting instances in which protected speech is not at play, blithely declaring a free-speech defense to be “tone deaf” is an evasion, not a position. And it is lamentably familiar to civil libertarians, who often take positions that most of their countrymen regard as tone-deaf. Defending the “Ground Zero mosque” was seen as tone-deaf, but I defended it. Defending accused criminals and their procedural rights is seen as tone-deaf. Should I stop? Defending due process for Anwar Al-Awlaki, an Al Qaeda terrorist, was tone deaf. And it was vital, because a precedent now exists to assassinate Americans without due process. The core liberties that protect all Americans, and that are especially important to the most marginalized, are much more important than “tone.” Suggestions to the contrary speak volumes about the elevation of rhetorical sensitivity over substance among those ostensibly seeking change. To me, it is bizarre that the same campus activists who declare their institutions and the United States to be rooted in white supremacy and hostile to students of color want to empower the very authorities in charge to punish speech at their discretion! The impulse to declare the First Amendment null and void when it interferes with punishing racist, hurtful speech may seem, in the moment, as though it shows compassion toward marginalized groups, salving their anger and pain. But it does so at their ultimate expense, and I’m not even convinced that the immediate anger and pain would be less. My article on the controversy at Yale expressed the belief that people who feel like outsiders and belong to a minority group at the university have the toughest road, all else being equal. ​I agree with student activists that their frustrations should be heard. In the torrent of email I’ve received over the last few days, I heard from one black Yalie who explained that, unlike his white classmates, he is regularly asked to show his ID on campus to prove that he is a student. My suspicion is that he is the victim of unconscious bias, or even deliberate profiling. Of course, there’s a chance he underestimates how often his white peers are stopped, but I doubt he’s wrong. Were I a Yale administrator, it’s the sort of complaint that I’d feel most able to address. I could and would arrange a rigorous inquiry to answer the empirical question: Are Yale security personnel stopping students of color more often than white students? If so, why? What would it take to remedy that prejudicial reality? My notion of how to make racial progress on campus is to tackle as many discrete injustices as possible as a start, knowing that many can’t be so easily studied, and that for multi-faceted reasons, no one can truly be at home while at college. **While hardly a cure-all, embarking on a series of discrete improvements strikes me as more beneficial than demanding that administrators validate student pain**, **especially since students are bound for adult life, where validation of authorities is unavailable.** It is with painful awareness of racism’s persistence, not ignorance or apathy or a desire to divert attention from it, that I reaffirm a belief that **resilience is among the most valuable things anyone can learn in an institution of higher education**. I may be wrong that students are being robbed of resilience and disempowered by mistaken ideological assumptions, as I’ve argued in recent articles. But right or not, my position is not a distraction from the matter of their well-being. It is my notion of how young people might best secure it, and to frame it otherwise is the diversion. As I put it to a roomful of impressive students at Cal State Long Beach, where I spoke last week on some of these themes, “You're all smart people. You're all capable of the strength that it takes to hear a wrongheaded idea, to react intellectually, even if you're also reacting emotionally, and to formulate a logical, persuasive response. Don't let peers, professors, or administrators convince you that you're incapable of that. If you're not there yet, you can get there, and it's worth practicing, because that sort of resilience will serve you well in your career, where no one is going to tiptoe around your feelings. And it is vital in civic life, because America is filled with horrific injustices. We need more people who are willing and able to look at them squarely and to persuade their fellow voters of sound responses.” To me, even after accounting for the history of race in America and racism today, that is still more empowering and validating than, “I feel your pain.”. SK

### ADV 1 – The Academic

#### The 1AC is an exposure of the hidden narrative of minority professors. For too long the black academic has been silenced at public colleges, stripped of their social identity and reduced to the status of “unprofessional” which stunts the possibility for reform. We need to make sure colleges do not restrict the free speech of black professors by refusing to hire them, and student demonstrations are also key to drawing attention to minority oppression. Academic speech matters too!

Wingfield ’15, [Adia Harvey Wingfield(), The Plight of the Black Academic, Atlantic, 12-15-2015, 15, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/the-plight-of-the-black-academic/420237/, 1-5-2017. SK]

In his new book, The Scholar Denied, the sociologist Aldon Morris writes that contrary to the discipline’s preferred origin story, the field of sociology was actually founded by W.E.B. DuBois, the first black person to receive a Ph.D. in the United States. DuBois earned his degree from Harvard, but due to rampant racial segregation at the time, he was shut out of many employment opportunities. He ended up working at Atlanta University (now Clark Atlanta University), a historically black college with few resources, but still managed to do pioneering work in the field of sociology. Morris describes in clear detail the ways that DuBois’s emphasis on race as a socially constructed—rather than biological—phenomenon threatened white elites of his day, who much preferred Booker T. Washington’s message that blacks should accept and embrace their subordinate status. Furthermore, many white sociologists co-opted DuBois’s innovative research designs, empirical methods, and scientific approach, while failing to credit him as their originator. Morris argues that consequently, DuBois’s centrality to the discipline of sociology and his role as one of the preeminent analysts of race relations have been obscured. DuBois lived and wrote his most famous books during the early part of the 20th century, but how different are circumstances for black academics today? The **recent student demonstrations** at University of Missouri, Yale, Amherst, Emory, and other universities **have drawn much-needed attention to the challenges that minority students, particularly black ones, face at predominantly white colleges and universities.** There’s a great deal of research—including the work of the sociologists Joe Feagin and Wendy Leo Moore—showing that the conditions black students are protesting are serious, widespread, and often ignored. In one account, Feagin shares a story of **a black student who waits after class to ask a white professor a question about that day’s lecture, only to be told “I thought you were waiting to rob me or something**.” Another student describes “one of those sad and angry nights” when, walking to the dorm, white students drove by yelling racial slurs and throwing beer cans at him. In Wendy Leo Moore’s study of elite law schools, she offers similarly wrenching examples. For instance, there is the white professor who punishes a black female law student for discussing the offensiveness of racial slurs, but does not challenge the white male law student who comments during a class discussion that black students are intellectually inferior. As Moore describes, even the ways law schools teach students to focus on “individual intent” means that **social, academic, and legal practices that discriminate against students of color can be summarily dismissed if white social actors “didn’t mean any harm.”** Thus, no matter how invidious the action, no matter the consequences of the behavior, legal reasoning centers on individual whites’ intentions and discounts the lived experiences of people of color. For faculty of color, similar processes are frequently at play. In fact, **predominantly white colleges and universities may even be more reluctant to recruit and hire faculty of color than students of color**. While students matriculate at an institution for a short period of time and then leave, **the tenure system means that faculty of color may remain at a university for decades, even a lifetime**. With this longer time frame, **these professors develop more of a stake in the school, and may be more empowered to push for the reforms many colleges resist**. For universities that see no real reason to change their existing practices, traditions, and organizational cultures, bringing in a critical mass of faculty of color is often a stated goal that enever materializes. Indeed, when it comes to faculty diversity, the numbers suggest a pretty bleak picture. **Blacks constitute less than 10 percent of the professoriate**, and these numbers thin out the higher the academic rank. And as lots of research shows, when these professors are in the numerical minority, their experiences aren’t all that different from what DuBois encountered as he attempted to navigate higher education in the early 20th century: exclusion, marginalization, and the consistent message that, as a black person, he was not suited for the academy and that his ideas were unwelcome. Indeed, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s recent suggestion that blacks are best suited for “less advanced, slower track school[s] where they do well” are strikingly similar to the arguments about black inferiority that DuBois confronted in the 19th century—the very assertions he was able to debunk with scientific research**. Many faculty members and administrators will dismiss this lack of diversity as a pipeline issue, claiming that they simply can’t find “qualified” candidates of color to fill faculty positions**. But as was the case in DuBois’s day, many historically black colleges and universities are populated by faculty of color, many of whom are exemplary researchers and teachers who work with a fraction of the resources offered at elite, predominantly white universities. “**Qualified” candidates of color** are there. They simply **are not proportionately represented in historically white institutions**. For faculty of color who do seek and find employment at predominantly white schools, research suggests that the issues they face are in some ways similar to those that students of color have described in the recent wave of protests. For example, in a recent study, the professors Ebony McGee and Lasana Kazembe noted that black faculty were racially stereotyped at work, including being generally expected to entertain and perform for colleagues in ways that were not expected of their white counterparts. Other black professors report that if they study issues related to race, their research is assumed to be less credible, serious, and rigorous than their white peers—even if white colleagues also study racial issues. Black faculty also do a disproportionate amount of service work—jobs that are expected of workers but not explicitly required. These can include mentoring and advising students and junior faculty, serving as a faculty advisor for campus clubs, or being on committees. And there are gender dynamics present as well. The sociologist Roxana Harlow found that **black female professors had to manage gendered racial stereotypes that they were “mean” and “cold” in the classroom, stereotypes that are commonly applied to black female professionals more generally**. **And this says nothing of the racialized assumptions that many students (and fellow faculty) bring with them to the university—that black Americans, and by extension, black professors, are less knowledgeable and credible than their peers of other races, regardless of the subject matter they teach.** This means that **in practice, black faculty routinely face students, coworkers, and administrators who assume that they are not truly qualified for or capable of faculty work**—all the while concealing the understandable feelings of frustration and annoyance that result. The overall message is that, like black students, black faculty simply do not belong. Though these issues are complex and won’t be solved easily, universities could begin doing more to support faculty and staff of color. DuBois defined the premier problem of the 20th century as the issue of the color line, and this certainly shaped his experiences in higher education. It doesn’t have to be this way today. SK

#### This exclusion of faculty coupled with silencing of student speech sustains a Eurocentric curriculum dooming grassroots and widespread movements for change while replicating colonialist subjugation of perspectives.

Everett ’16, [Gwen Everett(), R.I. college students demand expanded diversity initiatives, Brown Daily Herald, 4-20-2016, 16, http://www.browndailyherald.com/2016/04/20/r-i-college-students-demand-expanded-diversity-initiatives/, 1-5-2017. SK]

As students at Brown urge the administration to take greater measures to address the lack of diversity and inclusion on campus, **students and faculty** members **at** other **colleges in Rhode** Island **are** also **working to have their voices heard** **on** their campuses. Such events represent students’ and faculty members’ accumulated **discontent with the underrepresentation of diverse narratives in college curricula and the silencing of the voices of students of color** on campuses. Providence College On Feb. 16, about 50 Providence College students participated in a 13-hour sit-in outside President Brian Shanley’s office to demonstrate against campus racism. On March 7, Shanley published an action plan with a list of proposals that included requiring faculty members to participate in a “cross-cultural competency training” as well as revising the school curriculum to incorporate a range of diverse topics. But shortly after the plan was released, PC’s Coalition Against Racism wrote in a statement, “It is disappointing that … what we received was a largely repetitive response in the sense that these are answers that we have heard from him before,” the Providence Journal reported. In recent years, PC has taken measures to improve the state of racial diversity on campus, said Rafael Zapata, chief diversity officer at PC. “A lot of these initiatives take time,” Zapata said. “We’ve done fairly well in the past few years, but it can be up and down.” He added that attracting a diverse applicant pool for faculty member searches is a matter of “being intentional about our job descriptions and taking an active approach, not a passive approach.” Last year, PC held its first open forum with the campus community to update students, faculty members and staff members on the school’s progress on the strategic plan for diversity, Zapata said. He added that simply recruiting more students of color is not enough — **students need to feel included in the campus community**. Brown, for instance, is a place where the student body is diverse but not necessarily inclusive, Zapata said. But Kohl Peasley, a student at PC, said “there definitely needs to be a faster response time” to complaints related to diversity and inclusion. The administration took too long to respond to the complaints of student protesters earlier this year, he said. Julia Jordan-Zachery, professor of political science and director of the black studies program at PC, said she wants to see the institutional approach to diversity move beyond rhetoric and become more substantive. “When will we begin to see, for example, retention rates improve?” she said, referencing retention rates for faculty members of color. “When do people begin to feel they really belong on campus and aren’t just there because they make the campus look good but are valued for their intellectual additions to the institutions?” In February, white students at PC allegedly threw bottles at a group of black women who were standing outside of a party, the Journal reported. This incident marked the first time Harrison Meyer, a PC student, had heard of a racially motivated incident occurring on campus. “An act like that is rare,” he said. But campus activists have been very active in the past year to raise awareness about the racial tensions that exist on campus, he added. “I’m a white male, so I’m not at the other end of it too much, but I do have friends who have felt attacked or uncomfortable for their sexuality or their race,” he said. “It’s a problem, but I think it’s been worse at other colleges.” “There is a kind of invisibility and hyper-visibility around race” at PC, Jordan-Zachery said. On one hand, many **class curricula leave out texts by scholars of color, rendering the narratives of people of color invisible**, she said. Additionally, **when there are not many people of color on a racially homogeneous campus, they can also become hypervisible**, Jordan-Zachery added. It is damaging when “students are singled out to speak for all people of color or all people of their race,” she said, adding that “the kind of harm that happens from hypervisibility isn’t addressed.” Meanwhile, **there remains a stigma against speaking out about racial injustice** on campus for certain community members. “**One knows there’s going to be backlash**” when choosing to speak about race and social injustice, Jordan-Zachery said, adding that **it can be difficult to criticize the institution** she works for. To remain silent is to perpetuate racism, she said. But “which one is worse: to become complicit in my own oppression as a black woman, or to speak out (and face) real consequences?” she said. “So for me, that’s why I take the risk.” Rhode Island School of Design Earlier this month, Rhode Island School of Design students and faculty members gathered at Market Square, chanting, “I am not your token!” and demanding curricular reform and faculty sensitivity training, among other initiatives, The Herald previously reported. The protest was the culmination of long-term discontent over the lack of engagement on diversity and inclusion issues on RISD’s campus. Under the leadership of President Rosanne Somerson, RISD has been taking measures to promote inclusivity, wrote Jaime Marland, director of public relations at RISD, in an email to The Herald. In February, Somerson convened a Social Equity Action working group composed of students, faculty members and staff members to propose pro-inclusivity changes to RISD, she wrote. “Our charge is really to look over and assess what RISD is currently doing,” said Patricia Barbeito, a member of the SEA and a RISD professor. But there have already been a number of diversity action plans implemented in the past, including an effort to bring artists, speakers and cultural theorists to campus whose works address social inequity and difference, Barbeito said. “But the fact remains that the picture of students and faculty (members) … is nowhere near what we would like,” Barbeito said. Today, students demand that course curricula address issues of social inequality and reflect a greater diversity of artists, she said. Professors should rethink their assumptions and take into consideration the various identities of the students in their classrooms, she added. The RISD core curriculum is limited in scope, said Sebastian Niculescu ’20, a dual-degree student at RISD/Brown who uses the pronouns they, them and their. Art history, for example, offers a “Euro-centric survey of art,” they added. Though some professors make attempts to include art from non-European backgrounds, it is concerning when **one lecture covers 1,000 years of African art while another covers only 20 years of European art**, they said. “It’s strange that RISD only employs one professor who specializes in East Asian art,” said Jack Sivan, a sophomore at RISD. “Students aren’t required to be worldly literate in any way, which is problematic,” Sivan said, adding that the lack of faculty diversity — both with regard to personal identities and intellectual backgrounds — perpetuates homogeneous conversations. But the **underrepresentation of diverse narratives in lectures can affect the student experience** in more subtle ways than final grades, Niculescu said. SK

### ADV 2 – Western Epistemology

#### Silencing speech is a form of cultural appropriation and assimilation where another gives themselves the power to determine what is “legitimate speech” for you – it must be rejected in all forms. The argument here is simple – because college campuses silence speech they view as “harmful,” they impose a cultural conception based on prejudice regardless of the type of speech that they ban.

Matthes ’16, [Matthes, Erich Hatala (I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Wellesley College. I completed my PhD studies in Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, and I was an undergraduate at Yale, where I majored in Philosophy and English (with a Writing Concentration). My primary research interests concern moral and political issues surrounding cultural heritage, art, and the environment. For details, please see links at the top). "Cultural Appropriation Without Cultural Essentialism?" Social Theory and Practice, Vol 42, No.2 (April 2016): 343-366. SK]

People lead social lives, and **the breakdown of social communication can be deeply harmful**. Though there are nuanced differences in the accounts they provide , **this is a common theme among philosophers ’ work on silencing and epistemic injustice .** For instance, Ishani Maitra explains how **a speaker can be “communicatively disabled” because “she is unable to fully successfully perform her intended communicative act”** due to failures on the part of her audience. 29 According to Kristie Dotson, “**epistemic violence is a failure of an audience to communicatively reciprocate**, either intentionally or unintentionally, **in linguistic exchanges owning to pernicious ignorance**.” 30 As Miranda Fricker puts it, a speaker suffers a testimonial injustice when she receives “a credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice in the hearer.” 31 We can clearly see the aforementioned themes from the cultural appropriation literature emerging in these accounts: **the relevant harms follow from a speaker’s inability to communicate as a knowledgeable person because prejudice and ignorance render the audience incapable of hearing her as such**. Dotson and Fricker in particular emphasize the systematic nature of this epistemic injustice. On Dotson’s account, pernicious ignorance is a species of reliable ignorance with structural sources , and , according to Fricker, the prejudices that enable testimonial injustice track an individual across m ultiple dimensions of social life. How are the prejudice and ignorance that lead to an audience’s failu re to hear the speaker constructed? Both Dotson and Fricker emphasize the role played by images and stereotypes . In her discussion of “testimonial quieting,” one of the specific varieties of epistemic violence that Dotson distinguishes , she draws on the wo rk of Patricia Hill Collins, who identifies “controlling images” as a 29 Maitra, “Silencing Speech,” 327. 30 Dotson, “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing,” 242. 31 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing , 28. source of reliable ignorance. 32 One way that images can be controlling is that they invoke misrepresentations that affect how members of a cultural group are viewed. For example, Adrienne Keene has done important work identifying the range of ways that acts of cultural appropriation have misrepresented Native Americans by presenting monolithic and homogenizing stereotypes of Native identity. 33 Fricker identifies stereotypes as “the basic me chanism in testimonial exchange whereby prejudice corrupts hearer’s judgments of speaker credibility.” 34 Interestingly, Fricker offers an account of stereotypes as images that “are capable of a visceral impact on judgment, which allows them to condition our judgments without our awareness, whereas it would take an unconscious belief to do so with comparable stealth.” 35 Images, of one kind or another, are the primary currency of cultural appropriation in the arts, and thus on Fricker’s account, it should be no surprise that cultural appropriation can condition judgments that generate harmful credibility deficits. Note that in the context of cultural appropriation, the images employed do not even need to be mis representations in order f or the relevant harms to be generated, though there is no doubt a much higher likelihood of misrepresentation in such contexts. **Members of dominant cultures, in virtue of their social status, already tend to have** what Fricker calls **a “ credibility excess” : their credibility is inflated beyond what is epistemically warranted**. 36 When members of dominant cultural groups speak on behalf of members of marginalized groups, even if they speak accurately, their credibility excess can contribute to the judgment that t he members of the marginalized group have no special credibility with respect to their experience, that they lack what Uma Narayan has called 32 Dotson, “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing,” 242. Citing Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (Routledge, 2000). 33 Adrienne Keene, Native Appropriations, 2/17, 2014, www.nativeappropriations.com. 34 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing , 30. 35 Ibid., 37. 36 Ibid., 17. “the epistemic privilege of the oppressed.” 37 Recall Loretta Todd’s statement above: “**Appropriation also occurs when someone else becomes the expert on your experience and is deemed more knowledge able about who you are than yourself**.” 38 Or compare Lenore Keeshig - Tobias, who, in considering the helpful work produced by some non - native writers, provides the following qual ification: “Their commitment is truly appreciated. But in all honesty, there comes a time when they, like all white supporters of Native causes, will have to step back in the true spirit of respect for self - determination and equality , and let the real Nati ve voices be heard. These voices have much to offer.” SK

#### When the administration is white, the silencing of speech will obviously benefit whiteness – police on campus and administration refusing demands of minority students PROVES the imposition forcefully of cultural violence. And don’t say that police aren’t topical. If protests are prohibited, who else is going to come and shut them down?

Quinlan ’16, [Casey Quinlan(), 5 Things That Make It Hard To Be A Black Student At A Mostly White College, ThinkProgress, 1-25-2016, 16, https://thinkprogress.org/5-things-that-make-it-hard-to-be-a-black-student-at-a-mostly-white-college-33ef44abe034?gi=20edfa5787d9, 1-5-2017. SK]

Being targeted by campus police The number of **armed officers at universities has gone up in the past decade**, a U.S. Department of Justice report shows. During the 2011–2012 school year, 91 percent of public colleges had armed police officers. **There has also been a recent uptick in the percentage of private and public colleges that employ officers who carry guns,** from 68 percent in the 2004–2005 school year to 75 percent in 2011–2012. **There is already distrust between safety officers and black college students, who are often profiled by police officers off campus**, **and there has been a record of safety officers unnecessarily criminalizing small infractions or stepping outside of their authority when they approach black college students**. For example, **Portland State University students** and Black Lives Matter activists **protested the introduction of weapons to the campus police force** due to concerns about who would be targeted by campus police. Black college students are often stopped by officers for very minor issues. In September, a black college student who attended Hinds Community College in Mississippi was stopped by a campus police officer who said his pants violated the college dress code. When the student refused to show his ID, he was arrested for a failure to comply. Yet, after the incident, the college said he had not violated the dress code. Failing to get solidarity from the administration Among all of these problems with campus climate for black students, **the lack of administration response to racist incidents has been the most mobilizing for protesters.** The former president of the University of Missouri, for instance, was accused of failing to act after a string of racist behavior toward black students on campus — such as the African American student association president being harassed by men in a pickup truck yelling a racial slur, a white male student calling black students a racial slur during the rehearsal of a school play, and the drawing of a swastika with feces in one of the college’s bathrooms. He resigned in November of last year after widespread student protests calling for him to step down. Students on other campuses have had similar complaints, leading to other administrators agreeing to resign their positions. But there’s still a widespread sense that **college administrators aren’t sensitive to the concerns of students of color speaking up about injustices on campus**. At Yale University — where students of color have submitted a list of demands for the administration after reports of racist behavior from their peers — President Peter Salovey has defended some of the incidents that students are upset about. Salovey defended a faculty member who hit “reply all” to disagree with an email from the Intercultural Affairs Committee at Yale directing students not to wear blackface, claiming that students of color should simply avert their eyes from peers wearing offensive costumes. The email incident, though often portrayed as minor, was an example of a college faculty member undermining a task force working on making the campus climate more welcoming to students of color. For students of color, the choice to publicly criticize the committee represented a complete disregard for whether or not students of color feel welcome on campus. Are those students “coddled,” or are they simply seeking basic respect in environments that are tailored to white students’ needs? SK

### ADV 3 – Dissent

#### Colleges cannot silence dissenting speech – dissent is key to formulate opinions and start protests - restricting debate is a performative contradiction to argue for in debate it’s nonsensical.

Sweet ’16, [Amy Gillentine(), Counterpoint: Universities should allow dissent, dialogue, Colorado Springs Business Journal, 9-2-2016, 16, http://www.csbj.com/2016/09/02/universities-should-allow-dissent-dialogue/, 1-5-2017. SK]

UCCS has gained national attention, thanks to a email by three professors telling students if they are climate change deniers — they can’t attend the Humanities class at the university. The class, which spends a semester discussing a specific topic, was designed to address the effects of climate change — not discuss if climate change exists or not. Even Jeff Hays, chairman of the El Paso County Republican Party, has weighed in, saying, “**Controlling speech is the first step towards controlling thoughts, and these concepts should be anathema to any reputable instructor or education institution**. This Orwellian environment has no place in our free society.” UCCS is standing by the professors’ email, which told students that if they needed to address whether or not climate change was real, they should find another course. “The point of departure for this course is based on the scientific premise that human induced climate change is valid and occurring. We will not, at any time, debate the science of climate change, nor will the ‘other side’ of the climate change debate be taught or discussed in this course,” states the email, a copy of which was provided to The College Fix by a student in the course. “Signed by the course’s professors Rebecca Laroche, Wendy Haggren and Eileen Skahill, it was sent after several students expressed concern for their success in the course after watching the first online lecture about the impacts of climate change. “Opening up a debate that 98 percent of climate scientists unequivocally agree to be a non-debate would detract from the central concerns of environment and health addressed in this course,” the professors’ email said. This isn’t about whether or not you “believe” in climate change — it’s not like Santa Claus, you don’t get a choice to ignore the facts. But the professors bring up a wider issue: dissent and discussion on college campuses. It seems **these days, there’s very little opportunity** for either of those **on college campuses**. Instead of being **[to be] faced with dissenting opinions, learning critical thought and how to listen and evaluate opposite argument**, college campuses are full of trigger warnings so students are never made uncomfortable — and when students don’t like an idea, an opinion or a speaker, the college rescinds invitations, effectively cutting off free speech and limiting the ideas students are exposed to. That’s not what higher education is about. And while this particular class might have a very narrow range of discussion, the professors would be wise to devote a session to debunking the climate change deniers and giving students a chance to air their concerns and their doubts. After that groundwork, they could then move on to the real point of the class. But **closing off an avenue of debate seems contrary to the purposes of a university** — the free and open exchange of ideas, a place to move out of comfort zones, to learn from others and **to develop critical thinking skills** needed in a modern workforce. Let’s hope the professors decide to give a forum for dissenters and free speech. SK

#### AND, this is empirically proven: Stokely Carmichael, the first person to use the term “Black Power” and help ignite the movement was part of the SNCC, an organization which was started by Ella Baker after A STUDENT MEETING at Shaw University. Because Ella Baker was able to organize the student meeting in the classroom as a place of dissent against the status quo, the SNCC was able to contribute and be a crucial part of the civil rights movement aiding revolt in the future.

## Frontlines

### Overview – Black Academic

#### The first advantage is conveniently ignored – extend that the black academic’s voice is silenced in educational spaces and we should remove those restrictions in order to include their perspective to reject the language of the colonizer. This is the clearest link to the framework and the easiest place you vote aff.

Outweighs the disad/cp/k:

**A. The academic controls spaces of knowledge production which means that without inclusion of minority academic perspectives you cannot have liberation for any oppressed group – that’s an internal solvency link and a justification for the perm – that’s Burk**

**B. Extend Wingfield – the starting step to any reform is to introduce revolutionary perspectives – this is what colleges are scared of which means we are a direct critique of the institution**

**C. Material conditions – black professors and phd students are being SHUT OUT from educational spaces – ask yourself would you exclude a minority judge or a minority debater? If the answer is no you MUST vote aff to make sure that in educational spaces people are not excluded.**

### Overview – Permutation

#### Big mistake – the perm card from the aff is conceded – its literally amazing.

#### First Perm : Extend Friedersdorf ’15 - They claim that their method is not compatible and are not opposed to speech restrictions but end up stigmatizing allies of their goal which dooms any real solution. Only a combination of reducing free speech restrictions and a more ideological critique can address material conditions without validating positions with the same authority they criticize.

#### Second Perm and Disad to the alternative without the aff: They say their method is not compatible and say they don’t oppose speech restrictions which stigmatizes their allies and dooms solutions. We must combine perspectives and reduce free speech restrictions with a more ideological critique to address material conditions. They rely on stigmatism and policing speech, claim to “shape norms” without providing a mechanism to do so, and try to “police” the speech of the aff which just reduces to validation from the same authority they criticize and dooms their movement as they alienate allies.

### AT: Hate Speech

#### The Supreme court has ruled that ‘hate speech’ is excluded from the first amendment.

Lauren Carroll, politifact, 2015, ["CNN's Chris Cuomo: First Amendment doesn't cover hate speech”, http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/may/07/chris-cuomo/cnns-chris-cuomo-first-amendment-doesnt-cover-hate/, 1-5-2017] JMS

Cuomo said, "Hate speech is excluded from protection" under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has ruled that certain categories of speech are excluded from constitutional protection, such as a threat or "fighting words." Sometimes, speech can be both a threat and hate speech, in which case it would not necessarily have First Amendment protection.

#### Aff solves hate speech: Promoting excluded voices, combats hate speech.

Alexander Davidson, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, 2016, ["The Freedom of Speech in Public Forums on College Campuses: A Single-Site Case Study on Pushing the Boundaries of the Freedom of Speech ", http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&amp;context=joursp, 1-5-2017] JMS

All experts agreed thatnegative speech creates awareness that surrounds a certain topic. They all noted that “good speech” surfaces to combat the “bad speech.” Humphrey notes that, “We have seen a lot of students stand up and say that this isn’t welcomein this community. It galvanized a movement that said we need to do better” (Appendix A). Den Otter notes something very similar, stating that, “I think any time that there’s some kind of racist incident on campus, people start talking about it. They’re made more aware of it” (Appendix B). And Loving advocates for people to not just stand idly while hate speech is taking place around them, that, “If racial slurs were met with more conversation, evil councils being remedied by good councils, then how long would that atmosphere remain on campus?” (Appendix C). The research shows that these suggestions and statements are true, if history is used as an indicator. Various incidents that have occurred, such as the California Polytechnic State University College Republicans Free Speech Wall, the Crops House Incident and the Charlie Hebdo Attacks have created movements against the negative speech that took place. Many times when “bad speech” shows its face, there are people who use “good speech” to combat the issue.

#### Turn – free speech best solution to hate speech. Restrictions fuel hate speech which causes your impact faster, makes it bigger, and makes it more likely.

Stevens and Phillips ’16, [Sean Stevens(), Free Speech is the Most Effective Antidote to Hate Speech, Heterodox Academy, 12-5-2016, 16, http://heterodoxacademy.org/2016/12/05/free-speech-is-the-most-effective-antidote-to-hate-speech/, 1-4-2017. SK]

On December 6, Texas A&M University will play host to Richard Spencer, a leader of the “alt-right” movement, and an open white supremacist. Many will likely view Spencer’s presence at Texas A & M as confirmation that Donald Trump’s election to the presidency has allowed fringe political views to enter mainstream discussion. When Spencer, or someone like him, makes a statement like “America was, until this last generation, a white country, designed for ourselves and our posterity. It is our creation and our inheritance, and it belongs to us,” many people may question why we should remain committed to the First Amendment. This post argues why members of an academic community need to remain steadfast in that commitment, even when faced with a figure like Richard Spencer. When hardcore racists and xenophobes remain consigned to obscure message boards and poorly attended events, it’s fairly easy to believe in freedom of speech and expression. But **when organized hatred arrives on campus, such defenses can be perceived as granting unacceptable cover** to viewpoints that are widely considered despicable and immoral. To many, such viewpoints don’t deserve the protection of the First Amendment. Unfortunately, **the impulse to start limiting speech** – either with on-the-books campus speech codes or simply through stepped-up social enforcement of speech taboos – **is likely to pour gasoline on the fire and make the problem worse**. Research suggests that **restrictions perceived to threaten or possibly eliminate behavioral freedoms may trigger “psychological reactance”, and increase one’s desire to engage in the restricted behavior**. For instance, Worchel and colleagues (1975) assessed desire to hear censored material among students at the University of North Carolina. The experimenter informed participants that they would soon be hearing a tape recording of a speech and that the study was interested in how personal characteristics impact a speaker’s ability to get their message across. Some participants were then informed that because a student group (either the YM-YWCA or the John Birch Society) on campus was opposed to the content of the speech, the experimenter would not be able to play the taped recording. Consistent with reactance theory, participants who were informed they could not hear the content of the speech, reported a stronger desire to do so. This effect occurred regardless of whether the student group was viewed positively (YM-YWCA) or negatively (the John Birch Society). More recently, Silvia (2005) investigated if interpersonal similarity could override the experience of psychological reactance. In two separate studies, psychological reactance occurred when people felt their attitudinal freedom was threatened when interpersonal similarity was low, but not when interpersonal similarity was high. More broadly, while ingroup favoritism may depend more on positive affect towards the ingroup, **perceived discrimination by an outgroup increases ingroup identification, and can increase anger, hostility and aggression towards outgroups**. If we incorporate these findings into our thinking about whether to censor a speaker, the following chain of events does not seem to be an implausible reaction: Censoring a speaker may increase some people’s desire to hear that speaker’s message, particularly those who perceive the speaker as similar to them in some way. **Censoring a speaker may be perceived as threatening to people who perceive the speaker as similar to them**. **The perception of threat is likely to increase identification with a salient ingroup**. Increased ingroup identification in response to threat may result in anger, hostility, and aggression towards outgroups. In other words, censoring and disinviting a speaker such as Richard Spencer may actually make him and his views more popular. Instead of acting as an antidote to hatred, censorship may pour gasoline onto an already simmering fire. Calls to disinvite, and thus censor, Spencer may produce the unintended consequence of promoting his vile, racist views. People like Spencer revel in the power of their words to arouse emotions and strong reactions in their opponents. They interpret attempts to silence and exile their voices as fear of the truth they possess. **The alt-right movement confidently hoists the pirate flag of rebellion, but it can only claim to be rebellious if it can point to the “powers that be” trying to shut them down.** **Meeting hate speech with more speech** is hard. It is extremely difficult to engage with people who hold beliefs that call another’s humanity into question. But **engagement may be the most effective tool we have.** Speech codes and disinvitations may feel good in the moment, but they represent an easy way out. Often, what has been made taboo and socially undesirable comes back stronger than before. We believe a stronger antidote is needed, and that antidote is more speech. To challenge Spencer, this speech can take different forms; and on December 6, some may find it cathartic, empowering and/or exciting to do so. However, we urge that opposition be constructive, not disruptive. Donating to counter causes, such as the Anti-Defamation League, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, and the National Organization for Advancement of Colored People’s legal defense fund, that are actively combatting people like Spencer and his ideas is one useful tactic. Indeed, shortly after the announcement that Spencer would be speaking on campus, the psychology department at Texas A & M launched a fundraising campaign to protest Spencer and his racism. Joining this protest and funding groups opposed to Spencer is a form of speech and action that makes Spencer weaker, not strong. Same thing for attending his talk and rebutting his speech during the question and answer period. **Speech can be deployed as a scalpel, able to cut through vitriol, rhetoric and mendacity to help counter speech that advocates for harmful ideas and outcomes**. SK

#### Outweighs:

1. Recency: It’s from a month and a day ago.
2. Specificity: Talks about hate speech on college campus’ specifically.

Volokh ’15: Eugene Volokh, Washington Post, 5-7-2015, Eugene Volokh teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, and a seminar on firearms regulation policy. Before coming to UCLA, he clerked for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on the U.S. Supreme Court and for Judge Alex Kozinski on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Volokh is the author of the textbooks The First Amendment and Related Statutes (4th ed. 2011), The Religion Clauses and Related Statutes (2005), and Academic Legal Writing (4th ed. 2010), as well as over 70 law review articles. Volokh is also an Academic Affiliate for the Mayer Brown LLP law firm, ["No, there’s no “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment", https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm\_term=.a1263fe97fa8] EW 1-5-2017

I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s [Tweet](https://twitter.com/ChrisCuomo/status/595934009764487168) that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend. The Supreme Court did, in Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), uphold a “group libel” law that outlawed statements that expose racial or religious groups to contempt or hatred, unless the speaker could show that the statements were true, and were said with “good motives” and for “justifiable ends.” But this too was treated by the Court as just a special case of a broader First Amendment exception — the one for libel generally. And Beauharnais is widely understood to no longer be good law, given the Court’s restrictions on the libel exception. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) (rejecting the view that libel is categorically unprotected, and holding that the libel exception requires a showing that the libelous accusations be “of and concerning” a particular person); Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) (generally rejecting the view that a defense of truth can be limited to speech that is said for “good motives” and for “justifiable ends”); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986) (generally rejecting the view that the burden of proving truth can be placed on the defendant); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) (holding that singling bigoted speech is unconstitutional, even when that speech fits within a First Amendment exception); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Beauharnais is no longer good law); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (likewise); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (likewise); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978) (likewise); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973) (likewise); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1043-45 (4th ed. 2011); Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Law, §12-17, at 926; Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 219 (1991); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 297, 330-31 (1988). Finally, “hostile environment harassment law” has sometimes been read as applying civil liability — or administrative discipline by universities — to allegedly bigoted speech in workplaces, universities, and places of public accommodation. There is a hot debate on whether those restrictions are indeed constitutional; they have generally been held unconstitutional when applied to universities, but decisions are mixed as to civil liability based on speech that creates hostile environments in workplaces (see [the pages linked to at this site](http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/harass) for more information on the subject). But even when those restrictions have been upheld, they have been justified precisely on the rationale that they do not criminalize speech (or otherwise punish it) in society at large, but only apply to particular contexts, such as workplaces. None of them represent a “hate speech” exception, nor have they been defined in terms of “hate speech.” For this very reason, “hate speech” also doesn’t have any fixed legal meaning under U.S. law. U.S. law has just never had occasion to define “hate speech” — any more than it has had occasion to define rudeness, evil ideas, unpatriotic speech, or any other kind of speech that people might condemn but that does not constitute a legally relevant category.

#### Material conditions prove that minority scholarship is silenced – an overwhelming white curricula dooms grassroots and thus widespread movements for change – empirics of material conditions prove.

Wong ’15, [Alia Wong(), Why So Many U.S. Students Are Learning Lies About America’s Racial Past, Atlantic, 10-21-2015, 15, http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/the-history-class-dilemma/411601/, 1-5-2017. SK]

Earlier this month, **McGraw Hill** found itself at the center of some rather embarrassing press after a photo showing a **page from one of its high-school world-geography textbooks** was disseminated on social media. The page **features a** seemingly innocuous polychromatic map of the United States, broken up into thousands of counties, as part of a lesson on the country’s immigration patterns: Different colors correspond with various ancestral groups, and the color assigned to each county indicates its largest ethnic representation. The **page** is scarce on words aside from an introductory summary and three text bubbles explaining specific trends—for example, that Mexico accounts for the largest share of U.S. immigrants today. The recent blunder has to do with one bubble in particular. Pointing to a patch of purple grids extending throughout the country’s Southeast corridor, the one-sentence caption reads: **The Atlantic Slave Trade between the 1500s and 1800s brought millions of workers from Africa** to the southern United States **to work on agricultural plantations**. The photo that spread through social media was taken by a black Texas student named Coby Burren, who subsequently texted it to his mom, Roni-Dean Burren. “Was real hard workers, wasn’t we,” he wrote. Roni-Dean quickly took to Facebook, lambasting the blunder: the reference to the Africans as workers rather than slaves. A video she later posted has been viewed nearly 2 million times, and her indignation has renewed conversations around the Black Lives Matter movement while attracting coverage by almost every major news outlet. “It talked about the U.S.A. being a country of immigration, but mentioning the slave trade in terms of immigration was just off,” she told The New York Times. “It’s that nuance of language. **This is what erasure looks like**.” McGraw Hill swiftly did its damage control. It announced that it was changing the caption in both the digital and print versions to characterize the migration accurately as a “forced” diaspora of slaves: “We conducted a close review of the content and agree that our language in that caption did not adequately convey that Africans were both forced into migration and to labor against their will as slaves,” the company said in a statement. “We believe we can do better.” Catherine Mathis, the company’s spokeswoman, also emphasized that the textbook accurately referred to the slave trade and its brutality in more than a dozen other instances. And McGraw Hill has offered to provide various additional resources to any school that requests them, including supplemental materials on cultural competency, replacement textbooks, or stickers with a corrected caption to place over the erroneous one. But Texas school districts were already in possession of more than 100,000 copies of the book, while another 40,000, according to Mathis, are in schools in other states across the country. “We’re not teaching the forest—we’re not even teaching the trees. We are teaching twig history.” If nothing else, the incident may serve as yet another example of why social studies—and history in particular—is such a tricky subject to teach, at least via textbooks and multiple-choice tests. Its topics are inherently subjective, impossible to distill into paragraphs jammed with facts and figures alone. As the historian and sociologist Jim Loewen recently told me, in history class students typically “have to memorize what we might call ‘twigs.’ We’re not teaching the forest—we’re not even teaching the trees,” said Loewen, best known for his 1995 book Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong. “We are teaching twig history.” This is in part why a growing number of educators are calling for a fundamental shift in how the subject is taught. Some are even calling on their colleagues to abandon traditional models of teaching history altogether. Instead of promoting the rote memorization of information outlined in a single, mass-produced textbook, these critics argue that teachers should use a variety of primary-source materials and other writings, encouraging kids to analyze how these narratives are written and recognize the ways in which inherent biases shape conventional instructional materials. In an essay for The Atlantic earlier this year, Michael Conway argued that history classes should focus on teaching children “historiography”—the methodologies employed by historians and the exploration of history itself as an academic discipline: Currently, most students learn history as a set narrative—a process that reinforces the mistaken idea that the past can be synthesized into a single, standardized chronicle of several hundred pages. This teaching pretends that there is a uniform collective story, which is akin to saying everyone remembers events the same. Yet, history is anything but agreeable. It is not a collection of facts deemed to be “official” by scholars on high. It is a collection of historians exchanging different, often conflicting analyses. And rather than vainly seeking to transcend the inevitable clash of memories, American students would be better served by descending into the bog of conflict and learning the many "histories" that compose the American national story. But according to Loewen, **the shortcomings of the country’s history teachers make the improvement of its instruction**, let alone the introduction of historiography, **a particularly difficult feat**. Compared to their counterparts in other subjects, high-school history teachers are, at least in terms of academic credentials, among the least qualified. A report by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences on public high-school educators in 11 subjects found that in the 2011-12 school year, more than a third—34 percent—of those teaching history classes as a primary assignment had neither majored nor been certified in the subject; only about a fourth of them had both credentials. (At least half of the teachers in each of the other 10 categories had both majored and been certified in their assigned subjects.) MORE ON HISTORY EDUCATION http://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/media/img/mt/2015/02/8006019316\_e906e883b8\_k/lead\_large.jpg?1430146146 The Problem With History Classes Who Should Decide How Students Learn About America’s Past? Why Civics Is About More Than Citizenship In fact, of the 11 subjects—which include the arts, several foreign languages, and natural science—history has seen the largest decline in the percentage of teachers with postsecondary degrees between 2004 and 2012. And it seems that much of the problem has little to do with money: The federal government has already dedicated more than $1 billion over the last decade to developing quality U.S.-history teachers, the largest influx of funding ever, with limited overall results. That’s in part because preparation and licensing policies for teachers vary so much from state to state. A recent report from the National History Education Clearinghouse revealed a patchwork of training and certification requirements across the country: Only 17 or so states make college course hours in history a criterion for certification, and no state requires history-teacher candidates to have a major or minor in history in order to teach it. “Many [history teachers] aren’t even interested in American history,” said Loewen, who’s conducted workshops with thousands of history educators across the country, often taking informal polls of their background and competence in the subject. “They just happen to be assigned to it.” “Many [history teachers] aren’t even interested in American history. They just happen to be assigned to it.” This disconnect can take a serious toll on the instruction kids receive, according to Loewen. Absent a genuine interest in history, many teachers simply defer to the information contained in textbooks. “They use the textbook not as a tool but as a crutch,” Lowen said. And chances are, that makes for a pretty lousy class. Loewen suspects that these and other textbook woes are largely why students frequently list history and other social-studies subjects as their least favorite classes. And perhaps it’s why so few American adults identify them as the most valuable subjects they learned in school. In a 2013 Gallup poll, just 8 percent of respondents valued history most, while just 3 percent voted for social studies. (First place, or 34 percent of votes, went to math, while 21 percent of respondents selected English and reading.) And as the McGraw Hill example demonstrates, the textbooks teachers rely on so heavily are prone to flaws. A National Clearinghouse on History Education research brief on four popular elementary and middle-school textbooks concluded that the materials “left out or misordered the cause and consequence of historical events and frequently failed to highlight main ideas.” And the flaws can be much more egregious than isolated errors, disorganization, or a lack of clarity—sometimes they’re fundamental distortions of the contexts leading up to many of today’s most dire social ills. Take the Civil War. As Loewen argued in a recent Washington Post op-ed, textbook publishers tend to “mystify” the reasons for the South’s secession largely “because they don’t want to offend school districts and thereby lose sales.” Some of the most widely used history textbooks today even insinuate that the South’s motivation for secession was simply to protect states’ rights—not to preserve slavery. And this “mystification” can come with significant societal implications. As The Atlantic’s Ta-Nehisi Coates has pointed out, Americans still disagree about “What This Cruel War Was Over.” A recent national poll found that while 54 percent of Americans identify slavery as the cause, 41 percent do not; beliefs over what schools should teach children about the cause mirror that distribution. “They use the textbook not as a tool but as a crutch.” Perhaps these realities help explain why racial achievement gaps are so large in social-studies subjects—comparable to the divide in math, a subject notorious for socioeconomic disparities in proficiency. One of the largest gaps is in geography, which saw a 33-point difference between black and white eighth-graders’ average scores on the 2013 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP); the difference between Hispanic and white students was 25 points. But the gap was also notably large on the 2013 U.S. history and civics exams, too. These disparities aren’t likely to improve, considering how No Child Left Behind has reduced the time dedicated to social-studies instruction nationwide—a concern highlighted just last week in a report published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. And the overall lack of achievement and engagement in social studies has been a concern among educators for decades. An Institute of Education Sciences report published in 1982—“Why Kids Don’t Like Social Studies”—found “largely indifferent or negative attitudes toward social studies subjects” among adolescents. “Many students found social studies content boring, citing that the information is too far removed from their experience, too detailed, or too repetitious,” the report concluded. “These reasons suggest the need to strive for greater variety in instruction and provide more opportunities for student success.” Ultimately, these education dilemmas extend beyond the classroom. Jen Kalaidis explored the consequences of declining social-studies instruction in an article for The Atlantic in 2013. Citing a report by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Kalaidis noted that “students who receive effective education in social studies are more likely to vote, four times more likely to volunteer and work on community issues, and are generally more confident in their ability to communicate ideas with their elected representatives.” \* \* \* The McGraw Hill fiasco is the latest manifestation of the Lone Star State’s fraught history of textbook politics. A few years ago, the state’s school board famously established a social-studies curriculum that, according to the Times, gave the subject’s textbooks a conservative bent. Texas’s high-school standards, for example, require that students identify Moses as one of the individuals “whose principles of laws and government institutions informed the American founding documents” and establish how Judeo-Christian, and “especially biblical law,” “informed the American founding.” The standards also effectively aim to distinguish religious freedom in the U.S. from “the separation of church and state.” But as Dan Quinn, a former social-studies-textbook editor who now works with the Texas Freedom Network, has noted, when it comes to textbooks, “what happens in Texas does not stay in Texas.” The state buys nearly 50 million textbooks each year, according to the National Education Association, giving it enormous influence on the entire country’s instructional-material market. Zack Kopplin, an activist best known for his efforts to keep creationism out of schools, wrote in an Atlantic piece last year, school districts across the country “buy books that were written to meet Texas’s standards, flaws included.” Kopplin even quoted Don McLeroy, a former chairman of Texas’s Board of Education who has advocated for the teaching of intelligent design, as saying, “Sometimes it boggles my mind the kind of power we have.” Texas’s controversies are emblematic of the kinds of disputes taking place nationwide. For one, close to half of all states, like Texas, adopt textbooks on a statewide basis. That means state education boards—not districts or schools—dictate the textbooks used in classrooms, a policy that the Fordham Institute has described as “fundamentally flawed.” In a report titled “The Mad, Mad World of Textbook Adoption,” the institute argued that “it distorts the market, entices extremist groups to hijack the curriculum, and papers the land with mediocre instructional materials.” **History classes often mislead kids with Eurocentric interpretations of the actors and events**. Meanwhile, the last year alone has witnessed an array of clashes over history education. There’s the recent (and ongoing) battle over the AP U.S.-history curriculum, which has become embroiled in a tug-of-war between those who say it’s too patriotic and others who say it isn’t patriotic enough. Similar debates have taken place over the teaching of civics—and, in particular, over one group’s effort to make the U.S. citizenship exam a high-school graduation requirement in every state. And this summer, Dylann Roof’s massacre of nine African Americans in a Charleston church—and the concerns subsequently raised about the persistence of white supremacy and ideologies symbolized by the Confederate Flag—renewed conversations about the distorted ways in which the history of slavery is taught in so many of America’s schools. SK

### AT: Historical Oppression

**1.** History is only valuable in that it contributes to invention – your historical oppression is only useful for policy if it is still relevant which means my framing excludes your disad – that’s Mariott

**2.** Only looking to history as a means of analyzing a policy is detrimental because it is backward looking and a true inventive politics needs to be forward looking – means you can’t solve under the aff framing with your performance – that’s Mariott

### AT: Kritik Alternatives

**The 1AC is a prerequisite to any genuine liberation politics in North America—my method of decolonization and my framing with Fanon of how assimilative and colonial politics are bad outweigh.**

**Kenis** explains,

**It’s time to stop fantasizing** and confront what this consummation might look like. To put it bluntly, **colonialism is colonialism, no matter what its trappings**. **You can’ t end classism in a colonial system, since the colonized by definition comprise a class lower than that of their colonizers.** 13 **You can’ t end racism in a colonial system because the imposed “inferiority” of the colonized must inevitably be “explained”** (justified) by their colonizers **through contrived classifications of racial hierarchy**. 14 **You can’ t end sexism in a colonial system, since it functions**—again by definition—**on the basis of one party imposing itself upon the other in the most intimate of dimensions for purposes of obtaining gratification**.15 **If rape is violence**, as feminists correctly insist, 16 **then so too is the interculture analogue of rape: colonial domination.** As a consequence, **it is impossible to end social violence in a colonialist system.** **Read Fanon** and Memmi. They long ago analyzed that fact rather thoroughly and exceedingly well.17 Better yet, read Sartre, who flatly equated colonialism with genocide.18 Then ask yourself how you maintain a system incorporating domination and genocidal violence as integral aspects of itself *without* military, police, and penal establishments? The answer is that you can’t. Go right down the list of progressive aspirations and what you’ll discover, if you’re honest with yourself, is that none of them can really be achieved outside the context of Fourth World liberation. **So long as** indigenous **nations are subsumed against our will** within “broader” statist entities—and this applies as much to Canada as to the United States, as much to China as to Canada, as much to Mexico and Brazil as to China, as much to Ghana as to any of the rest; the problem is truly global—**colonialism will be alive and well**.19 So long as this is the case, **all efforts at positive social transformation, no matter how “revolutionary” the terms in which they are couched, will be self-nullifying, simply leading us right back into the groove we’re in today.** Actually, **we’ll probably be worse off after each iteration since such outcomes generate a steadily growing popular disenchantment with the idea that meaningful change can ever be possible.** This isn’t a zero-sum game we’re involved in. As Gramsci pointed out, every failure of supposed alternatives to the status quo serves to significantly reinforce its hegemony.20 When a strategy or, more important, a way of looking at things, proves itself bankrupt or counterproductive, it must be replaced with something more viable. Such, is the situation with progressivism, both as a method and as an outlook. After a full century of failed revolutions and derailed social movements, it has long since reached the point where, as Sartre once commented, it “no longer knows anything.”21 **The question**, then, **comes down to where to look for a replacement**. SK

Three implications:

**A.** The method of the aff of decolonizing our mind against policies and politics of racial biases solves the 1NC impacts

**B.** Solvency deficit to the NC as it must work through the 1AC to function which is a sequencing issue which necessitates that you vote aff

**C.** Turns the alt because as the alt fails without decolonization it will increase disenfranchisement with change – [Wilderson’s argument of futility reinforce this]

### AT: Fem

### AT: Wilderson

**4.** Disad – Wilderson categorizes blacks under this “ontological framing” which is a fixed problem they can never escape – this sort of fixation on absolute truth is what dissuades inventive politics such as the aff which means A. *the alt can never solve anything and* B. *it’s proactively bad* – at best aff is a net benefit – that’s Mariott

**5.** Framing question – the assimilation ideology is what makes us believe that we have to listen to what the whites say – Wilderson’s analysis is based on the fact that the White body will never accept the blacks but that’s the colonial issue we avoid – that’s Fanon – means the affirmative sidesteps the 1NC entirely

**10.** Perm do the aff then the neg – First we have to orient ourselves away from these assimilationist tactics then we can break down whiteness – only by getting rid of the internalization where blacks begin to hate themselves can we begin this politics – that’s Fanon

**13.** Perm Double Bind – do the aff and the alt. Either a. the alt solves with the aff which means the aff is compatible or b. the alt doesn’t solve the aff which means it’s an insufficient alt – this supercharges any net benefit im winning as to why the aff solves the alt.

### AT: Islamophobia

### AT: Quare

### AT: SFO

**1.** I don’t speak for others – I don’t tell a black person what to do – rather, I introduce the bias of white privilege and how minority groups are affected.

**3.** Terminal D – the method of the aff to combat oppression is decolonization which can be used by all oppressed groups – means I am speaking for myself

**4.** Terminal D – Alcoff [insert author] speaks for others when s/he says we shouldn’t speak for others – contradiction in terms.

**5.** I am speaking from the viewpoint of an Asian American – uniquely key for politics as we are in a triangulated position to analyze white attitudes.

Junn[[1]](#footnote-1),

In today’s diverse environment, racial identities are not created equally. There are distinctive historical conditions, migration patterns, and government policies that influence the politics of group affinity in particular ways for Americans classified by race. The importance of racial group consciousness for political behavior should be treated as a hypothesis rather than an assumption. Making the con- nection from shared classification in a racial category to group-based political behavior is neither simple nor obvi- ous for non-black minorities, particularly those whose pop- ulation growth is attributed to new immigration. It is unclear how new immigrant members will adopt and apply the racial and ethnic categories imposed upon them.1 In contrast, the shared historical experience of profound struc- tural, economic, and social bias aimed against blacks cou- pled with comparatively low migration rates of new black immigrants leaves less room for maneuvering.2 Michael Dawson’s theory of the “black utility heuristic” remains a powerful explanation of strong racial group identity among blacks, and has had important influence on the language social scientists use to understand the inter- action between racial identity and politics. The contem- porary study of racial identity in the United States is based largely in concepts developed from the black case, and it remains an important foundation for the politics of race.But **the persistence of Asian American racial identifi- cation demonstrates that the processes of racial categori- zation** also influences the group identities of minority groups who do not share the same history of subjugation and degree of discriminationthat **is key to explaining black racial group identity**. **Asian Americans have been historically situated in a triangulated position** in relation to the black-white binary, and therefore represent **a critical case to examine how racial identification influences polit- ical behavior in a multiracial political environment**. Using the dynamism of racial construction and the implicit comparisons across groups in the racial order of the U.S. as a backdrop, we analyze the dynamics of racial group consciousness among blacks and Asian Americans by exam- ining the results of an embedded survey experiment designed to activate group identity. The findings from the experiment raise a number of questions about how to study and think about how racial group consciousness is manifested in politics once we consider racial identity beyond black and white. We introduce a set of theoreti- cal imperatives outlining how to better understand the formation of racial group identity among non-black minor- ities. In particular, we advocate for more explicit consid- eration of the structural incentives and costs of adopting racial and ethnic identities by highlighting the signifi- cance of U.S. immigration policy and its role in creating group-based stereotypes and racial tropes.

### AT: Tuck and Yang

**1. Perm - It’s try or die for research—it’s the only hope for inquiry—the aff is an investigation of the psychological and racial biases that are largely obscured, which is what their evidence calls for.**

**Tuck and Yang** explain,

Research is a dirty word among many Native communities (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999), and arguably, also among ghettoized (Kelley, 1997), Orientalized (Said, 1978), and other communities of overstudied Others. **The ethical standards of the academic industrial complex** are a recent development, and like so many post–civil rights reforms, **do not always do enough to ensure that social science research is deeply ethical, meaningful, or useful for the individual or community being researched**. Social science often works to collect stories of pain and humiliation in the lives of those being researched for commodification. However, **these same stories of pain and humiliation are part of the collective wisdom that often informs the writings of researchers who attempt to position their intellectual work as** decolonization. Indeed, **to refute the crime, we** may **need to** name it. How do we learn from and respect the wisdom and desires in the stories that we (over) hear, while refusing to portray/betray them to the spectacle of the settler colonial gaze? How do we develop an ethics for research that differentiates between power—which deserves a denuding, indeed petrifying scrutiny—and people? At the same time, as fraught as research is in its complicity with power, it is one of the last places for legitimated inquiry. It is at least still a space that proclaims to care about curiosity. In this essay, **we theorize refusal not just as a “no,” but as a type of** investigation into “what you need to know and what I refuse to write in” (Simpson, 2007, p. 72). Therefore, **we present** a refusal to do research, or **a refusal within research, as a way of thinking about humanizing researchers.**

**2. Perm—Endorse the 1AC as an affirmation of desire based research—that’s what Tuck and Yang actually advocate for.**

**Tuck and Yang** explain, [Tuck and Yang 14 Eve Tuck earned her Ph.D.in Urban Education at The Graduate Center, The City University of New York in 2008. She has conducted participatory action research with New York City youth on the uses and abuses of the GED option, the impacts of mayoral control, and school non-completion, and K. Wayne Yang, the co-founder of the Avenues Project, a non-profit youth development organization, and also the co-founder of East Oakland Community High School. He also worked in school system reform as part of Oakland Unified School District’s Office of School Reform. An accomplished educator, Dr. Yang has taught high school in Oakland, California for over 15 years and received the Academic Senate Distinguished Teaching Award in 2010, 2014, “R-Words: Refusing Research”. <https://www.academia.edu/3570279/R-words_Refusing_research>. SK]

Alongside analyses of pain and damage-centered research, Eve (Tuck 2009, 2010) has theorized desire-based research as not the antonym but rather the antidote for damage-focused narratives. Pain narratives are always incomplete. They bemoan the food deserts, but forget to see the food innovations; they lament the concrete jungles and miss the roses and the tobacco from concrete. Desirecentered research does not deny the experience of tragedy, trauma, and pain, but positions the knowing derived from such experiences as wise. This is not about seeing the bright side of hard times, or even believing that everything happens for a reason. Utilizing a desire-based framework is about working inside a more complex and dynamic understanding of what one, or a community, comes to know in (a) lived life. Logics of pain focus on events, sometimes hiding structure, always adhering to a teleological trajectory of pain, brokenness, repair, or irreparability—from unbroken, to broken, and then to unbroken again. Logics of pain require time to be organized as linear and rigid, in which the pained body (or community or people) is set back or delayed on some kind of path of humanization, and now must catch up (but never can) to the settler/unpained/abled body (or community or people or society or philosophy or knowledge system). In this way, the logics of pain has superseded the now outmoded racism of an explicit racial hierarchy with a much more politically tolerable racism of a developmental hierarchy.2 Under a developmental hierarchy, in which some were undeterred by pain and oppression, and others were waylaid by their victimry and subalternity, damagecentered research reifies a settler temporality and helps suppress other understandings of time. Desire-based frameworks, by contrast, look to the past and the future to situate analyses.

**1. Turn—Not speaking for others reflects blame and maintains the oppression of others; speaking is necessary and good.**

**Sells** explains,

In her recent article, "The Problems of Speaking For Others," Linda Alcoff points out the ways in which this retreat rhetoric has actually become an evasion of political responsibility. Alcoff's arguments are rich and their implications are many, but one implication is relevant to a vital feminist public forum. The retreat from speaking for others politically dangerous because it erodes public discourse. First, the retreat response presumes that we can, indeed, "retreat to a discrete location and make singular claims that are disentangled from other's locations." Alcoff calls this a "false ontological configuration" in which we ignore how our social locations are always already implicated in the locations of others. The position of "not speaking for others" thus becomes an alibi that allows individuals to avoid responsibility and accountability for their effects on others. The retreat, then, is actually a withdrawal to an individualist realm, a move that reproduces an individualist ideology and privatizes the politics of experience. As she points out, this move creates a protected form of speech in which the individual is above critique because she is not making claims about others. This protection also gives the speaker immunity from having to be "true" to the experiences and needs of others. As a form of protected speech, then, "not speaking for others" short-circuits public debate by disallowing critique and avoiding responsibility to the other. Second, the retreat response undercuts the possibility of political efficacy. Alcoff illustrates this point with a list of people--Steven Biko, Edward Said, Rigoberta Menchu--who have indeed spoken for others with significant political impact. As she bluntly puts it, both collective action and coalition necessitate speaking for others.

**3.** **Turn—Narratives of suffering are key to compassion and political action. The conclusions of the K are nonsensical.**

**Porter** explains,

First, attentiveness to suffering is needed because as fragile, vulnerable humans, we all suffer sometimes. The suffering I refer to here is that which has political implications. "How we engage with the suffering humanity around us affects and mirrors the health of our souls and the health of society" (Spelman 1997a, 12). Feeling compassion is a moral prompt to encourage a response to those we know are suffering. Nussbaum suggests that compassion rests on three beliefs about the nature of suffering.20 First, that the suffering is serious, not trivial. Second, "that the suffering was not caused primarily by the person's own culpable actions" (1996, 31).21 For example, suffering is caused by mercenaries or armies who murder all men in a village as "soft targets"; "smart bombs" that "surgically" destroy independent media networks and family homes; "friendly fire" that accidentally kills allies; and missiles on "probing missions" that kill civilians in war as "collateral damage." The Australian government's mandatory policy of detaining asylum seekers causes suffering. Third, "the pitier's own possibilities are similar to those of the sufferer" (31). Compassion acknowledges vulnerability, an admittance of one's own weakness, without which arrogant harshness prevails. For this reason, those who have suffered great hardship, pain, or loss are often are the most compassionate. Yet, we do not wish suffering on anyone simply to teach what is required for compassion. Cornelio Sommaruga, who headed the International Committee of the Red Cross for ten years, has reflected that it **was** his "daily realization that the more one is confronted with the suffering caused by war, the less one becomes accustomed to it**" (1998, ix). Just as Weil used the term "discernment" (quoted in R. Bell 1998), Nussbaum suggests that "judgment" that does not utilize the "intelligence of compassion in coming to grips with the significance of human suffering is blind and incomplete" (1996, 49). This judgment is crucial for understanding the conditions that give rise to injury and thus to the wise responses that might address such harms. When the experience of, forexample, being in a detention camp in a remote desert area seems to crush the morale of asylum seekers, attentiveness to their plight in the form of gifts, letters, and practical or legal help affirms their humanity. We see this dignity explained in Seyla Benhabib's concept of the "generalized other," which treats people as having equal rights and duties including the right to seek asylum when one has been persecuted, and the "concrete other," which "requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution" (1987, 164).** Ethical politics is about trying to cultivate decent polities that affirms human dignity. Such politics acknowledges the uniqueness of citizens, and affirms "our humanity in making others part of our lives while recognizing their right to be different**"** (Coicaud and Warner 2001, 13). It is [End Page 112] by no means simple to humanize the experience of the other when that experience is horrific, such as in torture, war-rape, sexual trafficking, or existing in detention camps. The "humanizing" comes in recognizing the intensity of pain, feeling some of the anguish, and realizing human vulnerability to the point of appreciating that in different situations, we too might be tortured, raped, forced into prostitution, or seeking asylum. Yet there are competing interpretations of the nature of pain and its causes, consequences, and moral, religious, and social significance. Debating pain and suffering places it in a political space. A compassionate society that values people must value different people with different interpretations of what is needed to ease suffering. It is hypocritical for states to mouth the rhetoric of compassion and respect of obligations to others, but in practice to ignore suffering. For example, mandatory detention of asylum seekers in Australia can last for many years.22 Isolation, uncertainty, separation from families, and memories of past traumas in one's country of origin often lead to mental breakdown or prolonged anguish. Yet the Australian government claims to respect the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. I have explained what constitutes suffering and that attentiveness affirms dignity. I clarify further the nature of attentiveness. If morality is about our concerned responsiveness, attention is the prerequisite to intense regard. Iris Murdoch borrowed the concept of "attention" from Simone Weil "to express the idea of a just and loving gaze" (1985, 34) on the reality of particular persons. Part of the moral task is, as Murdoch reiterated, to see the world in its reality—to see people struggling in pain and despair. Weil, too, gave "attention" a prominent place, grounded in concrete matters of exploitation, economic injustice, and oppression.23 Her emphases were pragmatic in struggling against the debilitating nature of life—how "it humiliates, crushes, politicizes, demoralizes, and generally destroys the human spirit" (quoted in R. Bell 1998, 16)—and idealistic in striving to put ideals into practice. Too readily, we think about suffering in the height of media accounts of famine, suicide bombings, terrorist attacks, refugee camps, and war's destructive impact, and retreat quickly into our small world of self-pity. As Margaret Little explains, Murdoch's point was that "the seeing itself is a task—the task of being attentive to one's surroundings" (1995, 121). We need to "see" reality in order to imagine what it might be like for others, even when this includes horrific images from war violence.24 Yet despite the presence of embedded journalists, media reporting of such events as the invasion of Iraq has remained entirely typical in that "the experience of the people on the receiving end of this violence remains closed to us" (Manderson 2003, 4). Without political imagination, we will not have compassionate nations. "Without being tragic spectators, we will not have the insight required if we are to make life somewhat less tragic for those who . . . are hungry, and oppressed, and in pain" (Nussbaum 1996, 88). In order for political leaders to demonstrate [End Page 113] compassion, they should display the ability to imagine the lives led by members of the diverse groups that they themselves lead.

### AT: States CP

#### CP fails – multiple warrants

Damerdji ’15, [Salim Damerdji, “An Argument against the States CP”, NSDupdate, <http://nsdupdate.com/2016/01/12/an-argument-against-the-states-cp-by-salim-damerdji/>. SK]

Suppose you are a security guard working the night-shift at an art museum. You realize a disgruntled co-worker is wandering around, and to your dismay, punching painting after painting. You could run up to your co-worker and tackle them, but that would certainly damage the next painting. In an ideal world, your co-worker would stop their rampage on their own. But based on their aggressive demeanor, you figure this is unlikely. So the choice is yours: tackle your co-worker (and definitely cause more harm) or do nothing at all with the hope that your co-worker will abort their rampage on their own volition. It seems pretty compelling that you should take matters into your own hands. While it’d be ideal for your co-worker to stop their rampage on their own, you have little to no confidence that they will, and so you still have a moral obligation to stop the rampage. Now **consider the States CP**. **The USFG sees serious harm in the status quo. It would be ideal for the 50 states to ban handguns instead of the federal government, but keep in mind, many of these 50 states openly oppose any gun control whatsoever, let alone a handgun ban**. Moreover, **it’s sheer fantasy to suppose all 50 states would act in unison**. In sum, **the ideal outcome, whereby the 50 states implement a handgun ban, is virtually zero.** Just as the security guard would be foolish to play the odds of not acting, the same would be true for the federal government. In both cases, **there’s little to no chance that the ideal actor would actually act**. And **so the obligation falls back to you, the non-ideal actor.** As the language here suggests, this logic applies to all alternate actor CP’s, not just the 50 States CP.[2] Let’s consider some replies. In 2009, Eric Morris offered the following response to JP Lacy:[3] one actor has the ability to directly choose between Federal and State action: the debate judge. This is roughly the same number of actors who have the ability to dictate Congressional/Presidential cooperation to get a particular law passed & signed, not to mention funded, implemented, and upheld in perpetuity. Though it may seem implied by Lacy’s language, there doesn’t actually need to be a single entity to push for the aff to happen (it may entail fiating a lot of congresspeople pass a bill, for instance). And even if it were the case that a single entity had to make the aff happen, the judge could not be that entity. The judge quite literally does not dictate congressional/presidential cooperation – the USFG does. To test whether the aff is desirable, we merely ask whether the USFG affirming would be good, putting aside the issue of whether the congressional/presidential cooperation it requires is likely. This is distinct from the issue with the States CP. The problem here is made vivid by returning to the security guard example. The security guard can agree that the co-worker would be the ideal actor. But the security guard lacks God-like powers to force their co-worker to stop their rampage. So it’s irrelevant whether the co-worker would be the ideal actor since we’re nearly certain they won’t act. Second, someone may reply, “Of course the neg world won’t happen, but neither will the aff world happen. The whole point of fiat is to discover the best outcome, not the most likely one.” **The point of fiat is not to figure out the best imaginable outcome – it’s to test whether we should affirm or not**. When the neg fiats a counter-plan, they acquire the ability to test whether the world of the CP is good. **But the neg world being preferable to the aff world isn’t enough to win.** (To think otherwise is just another bizarre implication of the contrived comparing worlds paradigm.) Perms demonstrate this. If the CP ended world hunger and gave everyone a pony, it’d be an amazing world, maybe even better than the aff’s world. But until there’s a disadvantage to the aff, then there’s still every reason to affirm. Counter-plans only matter if they are opportunity costs weighty enough to make the aff advocacy undesirable. In this case, the fact that the states are so unlikely to act means there’s virtually no opportunity cost to affirming. It looks like we’ve taken the “just imagine it would happen” view of fiat too literally. When the security guard imagines how great it’d be for their co-worker to stop their rampage on their own, the security guard doesn’t also need to believe that the chance of that happening is actually guaranteed. Of course the security guard can agree the co-worker would be the ideal actor; this just has no bearing on what to do. Fiating a States CP can only tell us it’d be good for the states to act[4]. But **given that it surely won’t happen, a States CP doesn’t change the calculation of whether the USFG should act**. We should be cautious about deferring to conventions of fiat over what seems to us to be the case in the security guard example. Jacob Nails offers insight here:[5] **“I won’t,” does not refute “you should.” … with or without an agreed upon convention of fiat…. Attempting to directly justify or indict a debate practice by direct appeal to fiat puts the cart before the horse**. There is no rule of fiat governing debates, over and above other considerations. It should be possible to drop the reference to debate fiat and make the same argument appealing to logic directly. After all, fiat is itself grounded in the logical principles of decision-making. If this task cannot be accomplished, the debater has most likely snuck some additional assumption into their notion of fiat that does not belong. Let’s abandon a misguided view of fiat, not a basic intuition. **When the ideal actor won’t act, the non-ideal actor must**. SK

### AT: Historical Oppression

**1.** History is only valuable in that it contributes to invention – your historical oppression is only useful for policy if it is still relevant which means my framing excludes your disad – that’s Mariott

**2.** Only looking to history as a means of analyzing a policy is detrimental because it is backward looking and a true inventive politics needs to be forward looking – means you can’t solve under the aff framing with your performance – that’s Mariott

**4.** Your impact framing shows that things are bad for blacks right now – probably means that any policy in the squo is antiblack so at least the aff has a risk of solving for something

### AT: Kritik Alternatives

**The 1AC is a prerequisite to any genuine liberation politics in North America—my method of decolonization and my framing with Fanon of how assimilative and colonial politics are bad outweigh.**

**Kenis** explains,

**It’s time to stop fantasizing** and confront what this consummation might look like. To put it bluntly, **colonialism is colonialism, no matter what its trappings**. **You can’ t end classism in a colonial system, since the colonized by definition comprise a class lower than that of their colonizers.** 13 **You can’ t end racism in a colonial system because the imposed “inferiority” of the colonized must inevitably be “explained”** (justified) by their colonizers **through contrived classifications of racial hierarchy**. 14 **You can’ t end sexism in a colonial system, since it functions**—again by definition—**on the basis of one party imposing itself upon the other in the most intimate of dimensions for purposes of obtaining gratification**.15 **If rape is violence**, as feminists correctly insist, 16 **then so too is the interculture analogue of rape: colonial domination.** As a consequence, **it is impossible to end social violence in a colonialist system.** **Read Fanon** and Memmi. They long ago analyzed that fact rather thoroughly and exceedingly well.17 Better yet, read Sartre, who flatly equated colonialism with genocide.18 Then ask yourself how you maintain a system incorporating domination and genocidal violence as integral aspects of itself *without* military, police, and penal establishments? The answer is that you can’t. Go right down the list of progressive aspirations and what you’ll discover, if you’re honest with yourself, is that none of them can really be achieved outside the context of Fourth World liberation. **So long as** indigenous **nations are subsumed against our will** within “broader” statist entities—and this applies as much to Canada as to the United States, as much to China as to Canada, as much to Mexico and Brazil as to China, as much to Ghana as to any of the rest; the problem is truly global—**colonialism will be alive and well**.19 So long as this is the case, **all efforts at positive social transformation, no matter how “revolutionary” the terms in which they are couched, will be self-nullifying, simply leading us right back into the groove we’re in today.** Actually, **we’ll probably be worse off after each iteration since such outcomes generate a steadily growing popular disenchantment with the idea that meaningful change can ever be possible.** This isn’t a zero-sum game we’re involved in. As Gramsci pointed out, every failure of supposed alternatives to the status quo serves to significantly reinforce its hegemony.20 When a strategy or, more important, a way of looking at things, proves itself bankrupt or counterproductive, it must be replaced with something more viable. Such, is the situation with progressivism, both as a method and as an outlook. After a full century of failed revolutions and derailed social movements, it has long since reached the point where, as Sartre once commented, it “no longer knows anything.”21 **The question**, then, **comes down to where to look for a replacement**. SK

Three implications:

**A.** The method of the aff of decolonizing our mind against policies and politics of racial biases solves the 1NC impacts

**B.** Solvency deficit to the NC as it must work through the 1AC to function which is a sequencing issue which necessitates that you vote aff

**C.** Turns the alt because as the alt fails without decolonization it will increase disenfranchisement with change – [Wilderson’s argument of futility reinforce this]

### AT: Fem

### AT: Wilderson

**1.** No link – I don’t defend state action – that’s the advocacy text

**2.** Aff solves under your framing – Wilderson’s writings must accompany goal oriented policy change which is exactly what the aff is

Wilderson in ’10, [Frank b. Wilderson 10 III, Prof at UC Irvine, speaking on a panel on literary activism at the National Black Writers Conference, March 26, "Panel on Literary Activism", transcribed from the video available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/222448, begins at roughly 49:10]

Typically what I mean when I ask myself whether or not people will like or accept my reading, what I'm really trying to say to myself whether or not people will like or accept me and this is a difficult thing to overcome especially for a black writer because we are not just black writers, we are black people and **as black people we live every day of our lives in an anti-black world**. A world that defines itself in a very fundamental ways in constant distinction from us, we live everyday of our lives in a context of daily rejection so its understandable that we as black writers might strive for acceptance and appreciation through our writing, as I said this gets us tangled up in the result. The lessons we have to learn as writers resonate with what I want to say about literature and political struggle. I am a political writer which is to say **my writing is self consciously about radical change but when I have worked as an activist in political movements, my labor has been intentional and goal oriented**. For example, I organized, with a purpose to say free Mumia Abu Jamal, to free all political prisoners, or to abolish the prison industrial complex here in the United States or in South Africa, I have worked to abolish apartheid and unsuccessfully set up a socialist state whereas I want my poetry and my fiction, my creative non fiction and my theoretical writing to resonate with and to impact and impacted by those tangible identifiable results, I think that something really debilitating will happen to the writing, that it the writing will be hobbled if and when I become clear in the ways that which **I want my writing to have an impact on political struggle** what I am trying to say when I say that I want to be unclear is I don't want to clarify, I do not want to clarify the impact that my work will have or should have on political struggle, is that **the relationship of literature to struggle is not one of causality but one of accompaniment**, when I write I want to hold my political beliefs and my political agenda loosely. I want to look at my political life the way I might look at a solar eclipse which is to say look indirectly, look arie, in this way I might be able to liberate my imagination and go to places in the writing that I and other black people go to all the time the places that are too dangerous to go to and too dangerous to speak about when one is trying to organize people to take risk or when a political organization is presetting a list of demands, I said at the beginning this is an anti-black world. Its anti black in places I hate like apartheid South Africa and apartheid America and it’s anti-black in the places I don't hate such as Cuba, I've been involved with some really radical political movements but none of them have called for an end of the world but if I can get away from the result of my writing, **if** I can think of **my writing** as something that **accompanies political struggle** as opposed to something that will cause political struggle **then** maybe just maybe **I will be able to explore forbidden territory**, the unspoken demands that the world come to an end, the thing that I can’t say when I am trying to organize maybe I can harness the energy of the political movement **to make breakthroughs in the imagination that the movement can't always accommodate**, if its to maintain its organizational capacity. SK

**4.** Disad – Wilderson categorizes blacks under this “ontological framing” which is a fixed problem they can never escape – this sort of fixation on absolute truth is what dissuades inventive politics such as the aff which means A. *the alt can never solve anything and* B. *it’s proactively bad* – at best aff is a net benefit – that’s Mariott

**5.** Framing question – the assimilation ideology is what makes us believe that we have to listen to what the whites say – Wilderson’s analysis is based on the fact that the White body will never accept the blacks but that’s the colonial issue we avoid – that’s Fanon – means the affirmative sidesteps the 1NC entirely

**6.** Assimilation is the driving factor behind the harms of ontological death because a sense of being is destroyed when being is subsumed under a white perspective which means AC controls root cause – aff comes first – that’s Fanon. Means the impact is inevitable if your advocacy can’t solve, presume aff

**10.** Perm do the aff then the neg – First we have to orient ourselves away from these assimilationist tactics then we can break down whiteness – only by getting rid of the internalization where blacks begin to hate themselves can we begin this politics – that’s Fanon

**13.** Perm Double Bind – do the aff and the alt. Either a. the alt solves with the aff which means the aff is compatible or b. the alt doesn’t solve the aff which means it’s an insufficient alt – this supercharges any net benefit im winning as to why the aff solves the alt.

### AT: Islamophobia

### AT: Quare

### AT: SFO

**1.** I don’t speak for others – I don’t tell a black person what to do – rather, I introduce the bias of white privilege and how minority groups are affected.

**2.** Terminal D – extend Fanon 3 in the framing which is *directly responsive* – my goal as a debater or theorizer is not to, here’s the exact text of the card “force anyone to act a certain way”, but rather my goal is to give them the “choice to choose” – removing these biases and examining and unearthing how these biases influence policies are the way in which we do that in the 1AC.

**3.** Terminal D – the method of the aff to combat oppression is decolonization which can be used by all oppressed groups – means I am speaking for myself

**4.** Terminal D – Alcoff [insert author] speaks for others when s/he says we shouldn’t speak for others – contradiction in terms.

**5.** I am speaking from the viewpoint of an Asian American – uniquely key for politics as we are in a triangulated position to analyze white attitudes.

Junn[[2]](#footnote-2),

In today’s diverse environment, racial identities are not created equally. There are distinctive historical conditions, migration patterns, and government policies that influence the politics of group affinity in particular ways for Americans classified by race. The importance of racial group consciousness for political behavior should be treated as a hypothesis rather than an assumption. Making the con- nection from shared classification in a racial category to group-based political behavior is neither simple nor obvi- ous for non-black minorities, particularly those whose pop- ulation growth is attributed to new immigration. It is unclear how new immigrant members will adopt and apply the racial and ethnic categories imposed upon them.1 In contrast, the shared historical experience of profound struc- tural, economic, and social bias aimed against blacks cou- pled with comparatively low migration rates of new black immigrants leaves less room for maneuvering.2 Michael Dawson’s theory of the “black utility heuristic” remains a powerful explanation of strong racial group identity among blacks, and has had important influence on the language social scientists use to understand the inter- action between racial identity and politics. The contem- porary study of racial identity in the United States is based largely in concepts developed from the black case, and it remains an important foundation for the politics of race.But **the persistence of Asian American racial identifi- cation demonstrates that the processes of racial categori- zation** also influences the group identities of minority groups who do not share the same history of subjugation and degree of discriminationthat **is key to explaining black racial group identity**. **Asian Americans have been historically situated in a triangulated position** in relation to the black-white binary, and therefore represent **a critical case to examine how racial identification influences polit- ical behavior in a multiracial political environment**. Using the dynamism of racial construction and the implicit comparisons across groups in the racial order of the U.S. as a backdrop, we analyze the dynamics of racial group consciousness among blacks and Asian Americans by exam- ining the results of an embedded survey experiment designed to activate group identity. The findings from the experiment raise a number of questions about how to study and think about how racial group consciousness is manifested in politics once we consider racial identity beyond black and white. We introduce a set of theoreti- cal imperatives outlining how to better understand the formation of racial group identity among non-black minor- ities. In particular, we advocate for more explicit consid- eration of the structural incentives and costs of adopting racial and ethnic identities by highlighting the signifi- cance of U.S. immigration policy and its role in creating group-based stereotypes and racial tropes.

### AT: Tuck and Yang

**1. Perm - It’s try or die for research—it’s the only hope for inquiry—the aff is an investigation of the psychological and racial biases that are largely obscured, which is what their evidence calls for.**

**Tuck and Yang** explain,

Research is a dirty word among many Native communities (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999), and arguably, also among ghettoized (Kelley, 1997), Orientalized (Said, 1978), and other communities of overstudied Others. **The ethical standards of the academic industrial complex** are a recent development, and like so many post–civil rights reforms, **do not always do enough to ensure that social science research is deeply ethical, meaningful, or useful for the individual or community being researched**. Social science often works to collect stories of pain and humiliation in the lives of those being researched for commodification. However, **these same stories of pain and humiliation are part of the collective wisdom that often informs the writings of researchers who attempt to position their intellectual work as** decolonization. Indeed, **to refute the crime, we** may **need to** name it. How do we learn from and respect the wisdom and desires in the stories that we (over) hear, while refusing to portray/betray them to the spectacle of the settler colonial gaze? How do we develop an ethics for research that differentiates between power—which deserves a denuding, indeed petrifying scrutiny—and people? At the same time, as fraught as research is in its complicity with power, it is one of the last places for legitimated inquiry. It is at least still a space that proclaims to care about curiosity. In this essay, **we theorize refusal not just as a “no,” but as a type of** investigation into “what you need to know and what I refuse to write in” (Simpson, 2007, p. 72). Therefore, **we present** a refusal to do research, or **a refusal within research, as a way of thinking about humanizing researchers.**

**2. Perm—Endorse the 1AC as an affirmation of desire based research—that’s what Tuck and Yang actually advocate for.**

**Tuck and Yang** explain, [Tuck and Yang 14 Eve Tuck earned her Ph.D.in Urban Education at The Graduate Center, The City University of New York in 2008. She has conducted participatory action research with New York City youth on the uses and abuses of the GED option, the impacts of mayoral control, and school non-completion, and K. Wayne Yang, the co-founder of the Avenues Project, a non-profit youth development organization, and also the co-founder of East Oakland Community High School. He also worked in school system reform as part of Oakland Unified School District’s Office of School Reform. An accomplished educator, Dr. Yang has taught high school in Oakland, California for over 15 years and received the Academic Senate Distinguished Teaching Award in 2010, 2014, “R-Words: Refusing Research”. <https://www.academia.edu/3570279/R-words_Refusing_research>. SK]

Alongside analyses of pain and damage-centered research, Eve (Tuck 2009, 2010) has theorized desire-based research as not the antonym but rather the antidote for damage-focused narratives. Pain narratives are always incomplete. They bemoan the food deserts, but forget to see the food innovations; they lament the concrete jungles and miss the roses and the tobacco from concrete. Desirecentered research does not deny the experience of tragedy, trauma, and pain, but positions the knowing derived from such experiences as wise. This is not about seeing the bright side of hard times, or even believing that everything happens for a reason. Utilizing a desire-based framework is about working inside a more complex and dynamic understanding of what one, or a community, comes to know in (a) lived life. Logics of pain focus on events, sometimes hiding structure, always adhering to a teleological trajectory of pain, brokenness, repair, or irreparability—from unbroken, to broken, and then to unbroken again. Logics of pain require time to be organized as linear and rigid, in which the pained body (or community or people) is set back or delayed on some kind of path of humanization, and now must catch up (but never can) to the settler/unpained/abled body (or community or people or society or philosophy or knowledge system). In this way, the logics of pain has superseded the now outmoded racism of an explicit racial hierarchy with a much more politically tolerable racism of a developmental hierarchy.2 Under a developmental hierarchy, in which some were undeterred by pain and oppression, and others were waylaid by their victimry and subalternity, damagecentered research reifies a settler temporality and helps suppress other understandings of time. Desire-based frameworks, by contrast, look to the past and the future to situate analyses.

**1. Turn—Not speaking for others reflects blame and maintains the oppression of others; speaking is necessary and good.**

**Sells** explains,

In her recent article, "The Problems of Speaking For Others," Linda Alcoff points out the ways in which this retreat rhetoric has actually become an evasion of political responsibility. Alcoff's arguments are rich and their implications are many, but one implication is relevant to a vital feminist public forum. The retreat from speaking for others politically dangerous because it erodes public discourse. First, the retreat response presumes that we can, indeed, "retreat to a discrete location and make singular claims that are disentangled from other's locations." Alcoff calls this a "false ontological configuration" in which we ignore how our social locations are always already implicated in the locations of others. The position of "not speaking for others" thus becomes an alibi that allows individuals to avoid responsibility and accountability for their effects on others. The retreat, then, is actually a withdrawal to an individualist realm, a move that reproduces an individualist ideology and privatizes the politics of experience. As she points out, this move creates a protected form of speech in which the individual is above critique because she is not making claims about others. This protection also gives the speaker immunity from having to be "true" to the experiences and needs of others. As a form of protected speech, then, "not speaking for others" short-circuits public debate by disallowing critique and avoiding responsibility to the other. Second, the retreat response undercuts the possibility of political efficacy. Alcoff illustrates this point with a list of people--Steven Biko, Edward Said, Rigoberta Menchu--who have indeed spoken for others with significant political impact. As she bluntly puts it, both collective action and coalition necessitate speaking for others.

**3.** **Turn—Narratives of suffering are key to compassion and political action. The conclusions of the K are nonsensical.**

**Porter** explains,

First, attentiveness to suffering is needed because as fragile, vulnerable humans, we all suffer sometimes. The suffering I refer to here is that which has political implications. "How we engage with the suffering humanity around us affects and mirrors the health of our souls and the health of society" (Spelman 1997a, 12). Feeling compassion is a moral prompt to encourage a response to those we know are suffering. Nussbaum suggests that compassion rests on three beliefs about the nature of suffering.20 First, that the suffering is serious, not trivial. Second, "that the suffering was not caused primarily by the person's own culpable actions" (1996, 31).21 For example, suffering is caused by mercenaries or armies who murder all men in a village as "soft targets"; "smart bombs" that "surgically" destroy independent media networks and family homes; "friendly fire" that accidentally kills allies; and missiles on "probing missions" that kill civilians in war as "collateral damage." The Australian government's mandatory policy of detaining asylum seekers causes suffering. Third, "the pitier's own possibilities are similar to those of the sufferer" (31). Compassion acknowledges vulnerability, an admittance of one's own weakness, without which arrogant harshness prevails. For this reason, those who have suffered great hardship, pain, or loss are often are the most compassionate. Yet, we do not wish suffering on anyone simply to teach what is required for compassion. Cornelio Sommaruga, who headed the International Committee of the Red Cross for ten years, has reflected that it **was** his "daily realization that the more one is confronted with the suffering caused by war, the less one becomes accustomed to it**" (1998, ix). Just as Weil used the term "discernment" (quoted in R. Bell 1998), Nussbaum suggests that "judgment" that does not utilize the "intelligence of compassion in coming to grips with the significance of human suffering is blind and incomplete" (1996, 49). This judgment is crucial for understanding the conditions that give rise to injury and thus to the wise responses that might address such harms. When the experience of, forexample, being in a detention camp in a remote desert area seems to crush the morale of asylum seekers, attentiveness to their plight in the form of gifts, letters, and practical or legal help affirms their humanity. We see this dignity explained in Seyla Benhabib's concept of the "generalized other," which treats people as having equal rights and duties including the right to seek asylum when one has been persecuted, and the "concrete other," which "requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution" (1987, 164).** Ethical politics is about trying to cultivate decent polities that affirms human dignity. Such politics acknowledges the uniqueness of citizens, and affirms "our humanity in making others part of our lives while recognizing their right to be different**"** (Coicaud and Warner 2001, 13). It is [End Page 112] by no means simple to humanize the experience of the other when that experience is horrific, such as in torture, war-rape, sexual trafficking, or existing in detention camps. The "humanizing" comes in recognizing the intensity of pain, feeling some of the anguish, and realizing human vulnerability to the point of appreciating that in different situations, we too might be tortured, raped, forced into prostitution, or seeking asylum. Yet there are competing interpretations of the nature of pain and its causes, consequences, and moral, religious, and social significance. Debating pain and suffering places it in a political space. A compassionate society that values people must value different people with different interpretations of what is needed to ease suffering. It is hypocritical for states to mouth the rhetoric of compassion and respect of obligations to others, but in practice to ignore suffering. For example, mandatory detention of asylum seekers in Australia can last for many years.22 Isolation, uncertainty, separation from families, and memories of past traumas in one's country of origin often lead to mental breakdown or prolonged anguish. Yet the Australian government claims to respect the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. I have explained what constitutes suffering and that attentiveness affirms dignity. I clarify further the nature of attentiveness. If morality is about our concerned responsiveness, attention is the prerequisite to intense regard. Iris Murdoch borrowed the concept of "attention" from Simone Weil "to express the idea of a just and loving gaze" (1985, 34) on the reality of particular persons. Part of the moral task is, as Murdoch reiterated, to see the world in its reality—to see people struggling in pain and despair. Weil, too, gave "attention" a prominent place, grounded in concrete matters of exploitation, economic injustice, and oppression.23 Her emphases were pragmatic in struggling against the debilitating nature of life—how "it humiliates, crushes, politicizes, demoralizes, and generally destroys the human spirit" (quoted in R. Bell 1998, 16)—and idealistic in striving to put ideals into practice. Too readily, we think about suffering in the height of media accounts of famine, suicide bombings, terrorist attacks, refugee camps, and war's destructive impact, and retreat quickly into our small world of self-pity. As Margaret Little explains, Murdoch's point was that "the seeing itself is a task—the task of being attentive to one's surroundings" (1995, 121). We need to "see" reality in order to imagine what it might be like for others, even when this includes horrific images from war violence.24 Yet despite the presence of embedded journalists, media reporting of such events as the invasion of Iraq has remained entirely typical in that "the experience of the people on the receiving end of this violence remains closed to us" (Manderson 2003, 4). Without political imagination, we will not have compassionate nations. "Without being tragic spectators, we will not have the insight required if we are to make life somewhat less tragic for those who . . . are hungry, and oppressed, and in pain" (Nussbaum 1996, 88). In order for political leaders to demonstrate [End Page 113] compassion, they should display the ability to imagine the lives led by members of the diverse groups that they themselves lead.

### AT: States CP

#### CP fails – multiple warrants

Damerdji ’15, [Salim Damerdji, “An Argument against the States CP”, NSDupdate, <http://nsdupdate.com/2016/01/12/an-argument-against-the-states-cp-by-salim-damerdji/>. SK]

Suppose you are a security guard working the night-shift at an art museum. You realize a disgruntled co-worker is wandering around, and to your dismay, punching painting after painting. You could run up to your co-worker and tackle them, but that would certainly damage the next painting. In an ideal world, your co-worker would stop their rampage on their own. But based on their aggressive demeanor, you figure this is unlikely. So the choice is yours: tackle your co-worker (and definitely cause more harm) or do nothing at all with the hope that your co-worker will abort their rampage on their own volition. It seems pretty compelling that you should take matters into your own hands. While it’d be ideal for your co-worker to stop their rampage on their own, you have little to no confidence that they will, and so you still have a moral obligation to stop the rampage. Now **consider the States CP**. **The USFG sees serious harm in the status quo. It would be ideal for the 50 states to ban handguns instead of the federal government, but keep in mind, many of these 50 states openly oppose any gun control whatsoever, let alone a handgun ban**. Moreover, **it’s sheer fantasy to suppose all 50 states would act in unison**. In sum, **the ideal outcome, whereby the 50 states implement a handgun ban, is virtually zero.** Just as the security guard would be foolish to play the odds of not acting, the same would be true for the federal government. In both cases, **there’s little to no chance that the ideal actor would actually act**. And **so the obligation falls back to you, the non-ideal actor.** As the language here suggests, this logic applies to all alternate actor CP’s, not just the 50 States CP.[2] Let’s consider some replies. In 2009, Eric Morris offered the following response to JP Lacy:[3] one actor has the ability to directly choose between Federal and State action: the debate judge. This is roughly the same number of actors who have the ability to dictate Congressional/Presidential cooperation to get a particular law passed & signed, not to mention funded, implemented, and upheld in perpetuity. Though it may seem implied by Lacy’s language, there doesn’t actually need to be a single entity to push for the aff to happen (it may entail fiating a lot of congresspeople pass a bill, for instance). And even if it were the case that a single entity had to make the aff happen, the judge could not be that entity. The judge quite literally does not dictate congressional/presidential cooperation – the USFG does. To test whether the aff is desirable, we merely ask whether the USFG affirming would be good, putting aside the issue of whether the congressional/presidential cooperation it requires is likely. This is distinct from the issue with the States CP. The problem here is made vivid by returning to the security guard example. The security guard can agree that the co-worker would be the ideal actor. But the security guard lacks God-like powers to force their co-worker to stop their rampage. So it’s irrelevant whether the co-worker would be the ideal actor since we’re nearly certain they won’t act. Second, someone may reply, “Of course the neg world won’t happen, but neither will the aff world happen. The whole point of fiat is to discover the best outcome, not the most likely one.” **The point of fiat is not to figure out the best imaginable outcome – it’s to test whether we should affirm or not**. When the neg fiats a counter-plan, they acquire the ability to test whether the world of the CP is good. **But the neg world being preferable to the aff world isn’t enough to win.** (To think otherwise is just another bizarre implication of the contrived comparing worlds paradigm.) Perms demonstrate this. If the CP ended world hunger and gave everyone a pony, it’d be an amazing world, maybe even better than the aff’s world. But until there’s a disadvantage to the aff, then there’s still every reason to affirm. Counter-plans only matter if they are opportunity costs weighty enough to make the aff advocacy undesirable. In this case, the fact that the states are so unlikely to act means there’s virtually no opportunity cost to affirming. It looks like we’ve taken the “just imagine it would happen” view of fiat too literally. When the security guard imagines how great it’d be for their co-worker to stop their rampage on their own, the security guard doesn’t also need to believe that the chance of that happening is actually guaranteed. Of course the security guard can agree the co-worker would be the ideal actor; this just has no bearing on what to do. Fiating a States CP can only tell us it’d be good for the states to act[4]. But **given that it surely won’t happen, a States CP doesn’t change the calculation of whether the USFG should act**. We should be cautious about deferring to conventions of fiat over what seems to us to be the case in the security guard example. Jacob Nails offers insight here:[5] **“I won’t,” does not refute “you should.” … with or without an agreed upon convention of fiat…. Attempting to directly justify or indict a debate practice by direct appeal to fiat puts the cart before the horse**. There is no rule of fiat governing debates, over and above other considerations. It should be possible to drop the reference to debate fiat and make the same argument appealing to logic directly. After all, fiat is itself grounded in the logical principles of decision-making. If this task cannot be accomplished, the debater has most likely snuck some additional assumption into their notion of fiat that does not belong. Let’s abandon a misguided view of fiat, not a basic intuition. **When the ideal actor won’t act, the non-ideal actor must**. SK

## A2 HW Cap K

### Overview:

There is a fundamental mis-understanding of the AC.

First, extend the FW. I concede that the current sphere of the academic is exclusionary and problematic. We can both agree that the university system is capitalist. This means it becomes a question of method. They provide no specific evidence as to why the AC challenging the suppression of speech by elites continues capitalism.

Second, Gut check this K. The Neg wants you to believe that somehow not ensuring free speech can check back capitalism? How can a revolutionary politic happen in a world where revolutionary rhetoric is not allowed?

### Links:

First, the Maira 14 evidence is powertagged. The evidence speaks the capitalist constructions of the academic institutions themselves. The knowledge production of the departments is not the same as the freedom of speech outside the classroom. The negative claims that speaking out is impossible, and this prevents activism. But this is not reflected in the evidence and simply isn’t true. The evidence speaks to the disparities of research scholars being controlled by the academy, but never how students can’t form social activism outside the classroom.

Second, the Brown 15 evidence concludes in the opposite direction. In the portion of the text the negative refuses to read it says that, “free speech and government control are in contest with one another.” Brown’s analysis of free speech is in the context of how the government seeks to restrict it, because it is against corporate interest to allow free speech. In this way speech becomes the commodity. This means that the Aff and Brown turn the K. Only by promoting free speech can we fight back against capitalist control.

Third, Reed 16 again concludes with the affirmative. The tag is simply not true. No where does the evidence indicate that exploring race in the issue of speech prevents class critique. In fact in the portions that they don’t read, the author says that BLM demanding a voice has been critical to challenge the current capitalist climate.

### Alternative:

Perm do both: Cross apply the reed analysis that says that the demand for a voice checks capitalism. This means that we can use the affirmative as a starting point for revolutionary action

### Role of the Judge:

First, they provide no weighing mechanism for what is “good” meaning default to the aff FW. Second, if you believe any of their links then you vote affirmative on the role of the judge. They just spent their entire NC telling you why the academic scholarship is rooted in capitalist action that should be reject yet call on you as the academic to endorse their scholarship. Their reliance on a capitalist endorsement shows proves their hypocrisy. You vote aff here.

## AT: Black Speech CP

#### [] – Zero solvency – supreme court will use the equal protection clause to roll back intentionally discriminatory laws regardless of racial identity

Nathaniel Persily, James B. McClatchy Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, Stanford, California., American Bar Association Vol. 31 No. 6, Nov/Dec 2014 ["The Meaning of Equal Protection: Then, Now, and Tomorrow", http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp\_solo/2014/november\_december/the\_meaning\_equal\_protection\_then\_now\_and\_tomorrow.html] bcr 1-6-2017

This seemingly semantic difference can make all the practical difference in the world. Affirmative action provides the most glaring example. Those who view the Equal Protection Clause primarily in terms of its anti-subordination purpose—that is, to protect historically disadvantaged and powerless groups from more privileged and powerful ones—would not treat discrimination against whites the same as discrimination against African Americans. On the other hand, those who read into the Equal Protection Clause a rule of colorblindness consider any racial classification—regardless of the race of the plaintiff—to be inherently suspect and only justifiable by the most important rationales.To a large extent the classification-based approach has won out. Although the Court has left open the door for some forms of affirmative action, given the importance of promoting diversity and targeted compensation for past discrimination, it has reiterated the rule that the constitutional standard should not vary based on the racial group benefited or burdened by the classification. And while this approach is often seen as the conservative approach to Equal Protection, it was none other than Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as a lawyer for the Women’s Rights Project at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who strategically brought cases to the Court on behalf of men to highlight the irrationality of gender-based classifications. Nevertheless, from time to time, and perhaps especially in recent years, we also see the Court’s concern for certain classes of people peeking through. The concerns that the Court has expressed for children of illegal immigrants, people with disabilities, or for gays and lesbians have arisen from particular concerns about laws imposing unique and irrational costs on discrete groups of people. Operationalizing Equal ProtectionThis preference for classifications over classes is characteristic of a set of similar judgments in which the Court operationalizes its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. (Professor Mitchell Berman of the University of Pennsylvania School of Law describes these as “constitutional decision rules.”) The now well accepted approach to limit Equal Protection to intentional discrimination is of a similar type. Nothing in the wording of the Equal Protection Clause would suggest such a limit. The Court could have gone in a very different direction in a series of cases in the 1970s and developed rules for prohibited discrimination that did not rely, in effect, on reading the minds of decision makers responsible for discriminatory state action. Indeed, Congress went in such a direction when it enacted and then amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to establish a system of burden shifting when certain policies have a discriminatory impact, regardless of purpose.

#### [] – The premise of their link is faulty – white experiences must be evaluated from an intersectional lense

Jamie Utt, Everyday Feminism, 1-31-2016, PhD candidate @ University of Arizona - Bachelor’s of Arts in Peace and Global Studies from Earlham College where he dedicated his studies to conflict resolution and Middle Eastern Peace Studies. ["3 Examples That Show Even White Privilege Needs to be Viewed Intersectionally", http://everydayfeminism.com/2016/01/white-privilege-intersectional/] bcr 1-6-2017

But privilege doesn’t function as a monolith; White privilege isn’t the same for every White individual and doesn’t function in the same way, to the same degree, for all White people. However, all White people experience racial privilege. Full stop. Our privileges, though, are complicated by other aspects of our identity that intersect with our Whiteness. Intersectionality is a complex idea, but part of it means that when we are discussing someone’s class or ableist oppression, we must consider those things in the context of other areas where they might be marginalized as well as where they might be privileged. Almost forty years ago, Derrick Bell wrote of the “interest convergence dilemma,” whereby institutional change toward ending racial oppression doesn’t often take place until White people see it in their best interest despite the incredible work of activists of Color. As a White activist who sees the liberation of those I love, as well as my own liberation, as tied up in realizing intersectional racial justice, what Bell’s work says to me is that I have a responsibility to find new ways of engaging White people, of helping White people understand our own interests in realizing racial justice and in divesting from Whiteness. And that’s the idea of collective liberation! Everyone with privilege has a choice to divest from systems of privilege and to join movements led by oppressed and marginalized people. When those movements are intersectional, then working in concert with others means that we are also working for our own liberation.

#### [] Lashout DA – purposely isolating white nationalism fuels a persecution complex that turns case

Briana L. Urena-Ravelo, Medium, 8-15-2016, Writer. Community organizer. Errant punk. Ne’er do well. Afro-Dominicana. High Hex Femme. ["Christian fundamentalists: you’re not persecuted, you’re just white", https://medium.com/@AfroResistencia/christian-fundamentalists-youre-not-persecuted-you-re-just-white-32c94dbf42f4] bcr 1-6-2017

This is all exacerbated by the fact that in this country, white people equate being a literal minority in regards to population to being institutionally marginalized. If you are a Quiverfull Christian, believe in The Rapture, read and take the Bible literally, are a complementarian and/or or very strictly anti-LGBTQ, anti-women and anti-reproductive health care rights, increasingly, you are most definitely going to be in the minority. But that’s because being small-minded, moralizing and judgmental towards people who don’t look, worship and believe exactly like how you think they should is definitely going to make you unpopular and isolate you socially because you’re being an ideologically sever, overly-zealous jerk, and no one likes that. It doesn’t mean you’re marginalized. You freely choose to hate gay people, have your women and girls wear long skirts, home-school and abuse children and have a bunch of babies you name shit like Josiah and Faith and Hope, that doesn’t mean you’re socially oppressed. If anything, in a world that punishes and demonizes people of color for having lots of children, trying to create or sustain sovereign nations or being orthodox or Conservative, White Christians have a lot of privilege in the ways that they isolate themselves from mainstream secular culture and create their own private communities that they do not let the government or others outside, even non-fundamentalist family members, dictate or look over.

I saw the White Fundamentalist Christian Persecution Complex used to commit and justify real persecution against marginalized communities at the hands of white people who, having seen themselves as Christian before seeing themselves as white, then compared themselves to oppressed global Christians, which the Atlantic article mentions. The author writes that Christians with “global perspective on their faith rightly identify themselves as part of a persecuted people in the 21st century.” However, that mentality is colonialist, fetishizing and white supremacist. It is used to further fuel an out-of-touch, misguided ideas of global south folks and a sense of oppression while ignoring the real oppressions White Christians commit and justify like mission trips to the global south and in poor communities and the often-exploitative Christian Adoption industry. The dynamics in those nations where non-Western Christians are persecuted are very different and far too complex and Western, especially white, Christians don’t have a right to claim those narratives for themselves, even if they wish to ally themselves with and support those Christians.

## AT Hate Speech CP

## AT: Expenditures DA

This DA doesn’t make sense.

First, there is no link to the affirmative. Their Levy 15 evidence indicates that campaign donations are protected free speech now, but never read evidence about how the AC makes this worse. The Disad reads: “The status quo is bad and post plan the status quo is still bad.” Gut check the disad. Unless they can provide clear link evidence that indicates why removing restrictions on free speech somehow increases already protected problematic free speech, then vote aff.

Second, they lose the Disad on the New University 16 evidence. After searching for this evidence online it is no longer in publication on the New University website, meaning you should reject the evidence and disad for the lack of ensured context. Additionally, this evidence is talking about one specific college needing to restrict donations but not about the university system as a whole. However, even if you don’t buy this in the text of the card that they don’t read, it says that multiple colleges are already restricting donations for student elections now, meaning the disad gets solved.

1. http://www.readbag.com/apsanet-media-pdfs-popdec08junn [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.readbag.com/apsanet-media-pdfs-popdec08junn [↑](#footnote-ref-2)